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MARTHA STEWART SAVED! INSIDER VIOLATIONS OF RULE
10B-5 FOR MISREPRESENTED OR UNDISCLOSED
PERSONAL FACTS
JoAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY*
On February 27, 2004, a federal district court judge sitting in New
York acquitted Martha Stewart of securities fraud.1 The charge on
which the court acquitted Stewart was based on the claim that Stewart
had willfully misrepresented a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.2 The material fact allegedly misrepre-
sented was Stewart's publicly articulated reason for the sale of 3,928
shares of common stock of ImClone Systems Inc. (ImClone) on De-
cember 27, 2001.' According to the government's case, this alleged
misstatement regarding Stewart's sale of ImClone's stock-a personal
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School of Law. Professor Heminway is a subscriber to Martha Stewart Living magazine and
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Maryland School of Law Symposium on Women and the "New" Corporate Governance, at a
research forum sponsored by The University of Tennessee Corporate Governance Center,
and at the 2005 Law and Society Association annual conference. The author gratefully
acknowledges the comments received from attendees of those presentations and the coun-
sel and research assistance of Tamara Lindsay, a member of The University of Tennessee
College of Law Class of 2007. Special thanks are due to Dwight Aarons, Gerry Moohr, and
Ellen Podgor, each of whom read and commented on this Article in draft form. Finally,
this Article would not have been written without the encouragement and support of Lisa
M. Fairfax and generous research funding from The University of Tennessee College of
Law.
1. See United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting
Martha Stewart's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the securities fraud charge).
2. Superseding Indictment 56-66, United States v. Stewart, S1 03 Cr. 717 (MGC)
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/
usmspbl0504sind.html [hereinafter Indictment]; Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 370 ("Count
Nine of the Indictment charges that defendant Stewart made materially false statements of
fact regarding her sale of ImClone securities with the intention of defrauding and deceiv-
ing investors by slowing or stopping the erosion of the value of the securities issued by her
own company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia .... ). The Indictment also suggests
that the statements made by Stewart were misleading in that they omitted certain material
facts. Indictment, supra, 60-61, 63-64. For ease of reference and because the essence of
the claim against Stewart lies in alleged misrepresentations, this Article will merely refer-
ence the basis of the claims as "misrepresentations" or "misstatements."
3. Specifically, the Indictment alleges that "STEWART made or caused to be made a
series of false and misleading public statements during June 2002 regarding her sale of
ImClone stock on December 27, 2001 that concealed and omitted that STEWART had
been provided information regarding the sale and attempted sale of the Waksal Shares and
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transaction-was made by her in an effort to maintain an artificially
high market price for the publicly traded common stock of Martha
Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (MSLO), the corporation founded by
Stewart and built around her domestic and marketing talents.4
Commentators, including legal scholars, have asked a number of
questions about the securities fraud charges in the Stewart case.
Among these questions: whether bringing the securities fraud charge
was an appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion and whether the
judge's acquittal of Stewart was correct as a matter of law.' This Arti-
cle further explores both of these questions in light of applicable legal
standards and the elements of a criminal action for securities fraud
and then uses the knowledge gained from these explorations to ana-
lyze the circumstances under which a corporate insider like Stewart is
likely to be found guilty in a criminal action or liable in a civil action
for securities fraud for a misstatement or omission of information re-
lating to a personal fact or transaction-information of a personal na-
that STEWART had sold her ImClone stock while in possession of that information." In-
dictment, supra note 2, 60.
4. Id. ("STEWART made these false and misleading statements with the intent to de-
fraud and deceive purchasers and sellers of MSLO common stock and to maintain the
value of her own MSLO stock by preventing a decline in the market price of MSLO's
stock."); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Mode 8 Bui'. ClM. L. REv. 165, 179 (2004)
("The government's theory was that Stewart committed securities fraud when she publicly
asserted her innocence. According to the prosecution, her denials of wrongdoing were
materially false statements, made with the intent to defraud investors by slowing or stop-
ping the erosion of the company's share value.").
5. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Goldman, Martha and Lynne: The Stewart Sisters and the Expan-
sion of White Collar Criminal Prosecution, 27 CHAMPION 8, 8 (2003) (criticizing the use of
criminal prosecution for fraud in the Stewart case); Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up
Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 9, 13 (2005) (critiquing the lack of a rigorous method for
prosecutors and others to analyze charges for so-called cover-up crimes); Moohr, supra
note 4, at 177-82 (critiquing the prosecution's power to decide what to charge, using the
Stewart case as an example); Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the
Business Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer's Clash with Donaldson over Turf,
the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIo ST. J.
CruM. L. 443, 452-53 (2004) (characterizing the Stewart prosecution as an example of a
prosecutor "piling-on"); Ellen S. Podgor, Jose Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who Should Be
Charged with Criminal Conduct?, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1059, 1068-70 (2005) (criticizing the
prosecution for bringing "extraneous" charges against Stewart); Michael L. Seigel & Chris-
topher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of
Counts, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1107, 1117-30 (2005) (questioning "redundant charging" in
the Stewart case); Harvey A. Silverglate & Andrew Good, Stop Creative Prosecutions, NAT. LJ.,
Aug. 30, 2004, at 26, 26 (asserting that the Stewart securities fraud charge is an example of
the use of a "creative prosecution" theory); Hans van der Touw et al., Opinion, Martha
Stewart Is No Ken Lay, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at M4 (providing readers' comments criticiz-
ing the Indictment); Stephen Bainbridge, I Was Right: Count 9 Dismissed (Feb. 27, 2004),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2004/02/i-was-right-cou.html (endorsing in a
weblog post the judge's opinion acquitting Martha Stewart of securities fraud).
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ture that does not involve the issuer of the securities as to which the
fraud is alleged.6
Specifically, Part I of the Article presents a general overview of
the elements of and burdens of proof for securities fraud actions like
the one brought against Stewart. Part II briefly recounts the facts rele-
vant to Stewart's securities fraud charge and the motion for acquittal
resolved in favor of Stewart. Part III considers whether the prosecu-
tion's securities fraud charge against Stewart comports with law, re-
flecting on both prosecutorial standards relevant to charging
decisions and the application of the elements of securities fraud to the
facts of Stewart's case, as those facts were known at the time the final,
Superseding Indictment was filed in January 2004 (Indictment). Simi-
larly, Part IV examines the legal basis for the court's opinion acquit-
ting Stewart of the criminal securities fraud charge before handing
the remainder of the case to the jury. This examination requires a
specific application of the elements of securities fraud to the facts of
the Stewart case in the context of the judicial review standards for
granting a motion to acquit. Part V summarizes and reflects on the
analyses conducted in Parts III and IV, and Part VI offers a brief
conclusion.
I. ALLEGATIONS AND PROOF: SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER RULE 10B-5
Martha Stewart was prosecuted by the U.S. government under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(1934 Act),' and Rule 10b-5 adopted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act (Rule 10-b5). 8
Although actions brought under Rule 10b-5 have roots in common
law actions for misrepresentation and deceit, the Supreme Court has
long been clear that actions under Rule lOb-5 have their own ele-
6. In this Article, the author references "personal" and "private" facts, transactions,
and information and uses these adjectives to distinguish the type of disclosures at issue in
the Stewart case from public statements made by a corporate insider in her capacity as a
corporate insider (which typically, although not always, would concern corporate-rather
than personal-facts, transactions, or information).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act broadly prohibits manipu-
lation and deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities and authorizes
the SEC to adopt rules and regulations "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors." Id.
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). Rule lOb-5 proscribes the following in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security: fraudulent devices, schemes, and artifices; certain
misleading representations or omissions to state material fact; and acts, practices, and
courses of business that "operate or would operate as a fraud or deceit." Id
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ments.9 The elements of a securities fraud charge or claim under
Rule lOb-5 differ depending on whether public (criminal or civil) or
private enforcement is sought, but three principal elements are at the
core of all Rule lOb-5 actions:
" manipulation or deception (including by the misrepresenta-
tion of, or omission to state, a material fact); °
" in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; l1
" with scienter.1
2
Successful private actions under Rule lOb-5 also require pleading and
proof of: standing (based on an actual purchase or sale of securi-
ties), 13 reliance by the plaintiff purchaser or seller on the defendant's
conduct, 14 causation of the plaintiff's loss,1 5 and damages. 6 Private
actions are subject to a specific statute of limitations, 7 and class ac-
9. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975) ("[T]he
typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation and deceit evolved was
light years away from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule lOb-5 is
applicable.").
10. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 463 (1977) ("Only conduct involv-
ing manipulation or deception is reached by § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5,"); see also THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, 3 THE LAW of SECURITIES REGULATION 570 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing the deception
requirement of Rule 10b-5); MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 523-24 (4th ed.
2004) (describing key elements of a section 10(b) claim).
11. E.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971); A-LAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION 276-77
(2d ed. 2002); STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 524.
12. E.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 212 (1976); HAZEN, supra note 10, at 203-04; STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 524.
13. E.g., Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 749; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952); STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 523.
14. E.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994);
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988); STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 524.
15. E.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 n.24 (5th Cir. 1981),
affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); STEINBERG, supra note 10, at
524.
16. E.g, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1629 (2005); STEINBERG, supra
note 10, at 524.
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (Supp. 2004) (providing that a private right of action for,
among other things, manipulation or deceit "may be brought not later than the earlier
of-(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years after
such violation."); STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 524. There is no specific statute of limita-
tions for criminal prosecutions under the 1934 Act. Decisional law therefore assumes that
the general five-year period for federal crimes applies to criminal actions under Rule lOb-
5. DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 845 (2003). Although
one federal circuit court has found that no statute of limitations applies to SEC enforce-
ment actions, SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1993), it is possible that the gen-
eral five-year statute of limitations provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to enforcement
actions under Rule lOb-5 (to the extent they do not seek equitable relief). See, e.g., Cathe-
rine E. Maxson, Note, The Applicability of Section 2462's Statute of Limitations to SEC Enforce-
ment Suits in Light of the Remedies Act of 1990, 94 MICH. L. REv. 512 (1995).
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tions have certain specialized procedural and substantive require-
ments."8 Criminal prosecutions under Rule lOb-5 are subject to
constraints not applicable to civil claims, including requirements im-
posed by the 1934 Act and federal criminal procedure.1"
A. Core Elements
1. Manipulation orDeception.-The requirement that a Rule 1Ob-
5 claim involve manipulation or deception raises a question as to ex-
actly what constitutes manipulation or deception. There is no defini-
tion of either term in the 1934 Act or in any rule or regulation
promulgated by the SEC under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Rule
lOb-5 itself (the SEC rule under the 1934 Act under which Stewart was
prosecuted) does not adequately serve this definitional purpose.2 °
Rule 10b-5 did not describe any particular practice that it
deemed manipulative or deceptive, as the statutory scheme
had anticipated. Instead, the SEC promulgated a regulation
that spoke with the same generality as the statute, making it
unlawful "[t] o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud, [t] o make any untrue statement of material fact or...
[t] o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit."... The rule
as promulgated drew upon no specific expertise of the SEC.
Its generality meant, moreover, that either the Commission
or the courts would have to give it substance through case-by-
case adjudication.2'
To a significant degree, the federal courts have determined the mean-
ing of the relevant language in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000) (providing specialized pleading requirements for pri-
vate securities actions).
19. See infra notes 51-54, 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing additional require-
ments and the different standard of proof for criminal prosecution under Rule lOb-5).
However, the same core elements applicable to public enforcement by the SEC are applica-
ble in the criminal enforcement context, even if they may be interpreted somewhat differ-
ently. See generally Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal
Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 1025,
1054 (urging a single construction of prohibitions in "hybrid" statutes).
20. See supra note 8.
21. Edmund W. Kitch, A Federal Vision of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. Rev. 857, 860-61
(1984) (footnote omitted); see also Norman S. Poser, Commentary, Misuse of Confidential
Information Concerning a Tender Offer as a Securities Fraud, 49 BRooK. L. REv. 1265, 1278
(1983) ("Rule lOb-5-the only rule under section 10(b) that is used to prohibit misuse of
non-public information-does not, however, define any specific practices."); Charles M.
Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DuKE L.J. 54, 73 n.67 ("Rule 10b-5's
prohibition of all 'fraudulent and deceptive' practices may not very clearly define the con-
duct being prohibited ....").
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lOb-5. The manipulation or deception element has been the subject
of numerous decisions over the years since Rule 10b-5 was adopted.22
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has stated that it views "ma-
nipulation" as more of a "term of art" relating to market transactions
in securities. 23 Deception, on the other hand, involves dishonest con-
duct that has meaning in a broader context.24 Legal scholars have
contributed to the debate over the meaning of these terms. 5 Yet,
clarity has not been achieved.
Moreover, Rule lOb-5 (read, as it must be, in light of section
10(b) of the 1934 Act), has three separate component parts, each of
which addresses a different type of manipulative or deceptive conduct.
"Significantly, this rule covers not only misrepresentations, but de-
vices, schemes, or artifices to defraud; and acts, practices, and courses
of business which could operate as a fraud. '26 Said another way, "mar-
ket manipulation carries with it liability under Rule lOb-5 (a) and (c),
separate from . . .omissions liability" under Rule lOb-5(b) .27 These
22. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (equating "manip-
ulation" in the section 10(b) context with "artificially affecting market activity in order to
mislead investors"); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) ("Use of the
word 'manipulative' is especially significant.... It connotes intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of
securities."); United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1991) (assuming, with-
out deciding, that manipulation may exist "where the purpose of [a] transaction is solely to
affect the price of a security"); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968) (stating
that "the definition of 'deception' may vary with the circumstances" and finding deception
in a board of directors' adoption of resolutions containing two material
misrepresentations).
23. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476; see also Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (stating that manipulation "is
and was virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets"); NAGY ET
AL., supra note 17, at 23 ("The term 'manipulative' has a specialized meaning . . .");
STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 558 ("[T]he Supreme Court has construed that word as a term
of art encompassing market operations.").
24. Pappas, 393 F.2d at 869; see also NAGY ET AL., supra note 17, at 23 ("Deception in-
cludes outright misrepresentations as well as statements that mislead by omission, even if
such statements are literally true (so-called half-truths).").
25. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of
Its Impact upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 574-75 (1977)
(exploring the meaning of these terms in arguing the ambiguity of section 10(b)); Eliza-
beth A. Nowicki, 10(b) or not 10(b)?: Yanking the Security Blanket for Attorneys in Securities
Litigation, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 637, 678, 682-87 (defining key terms used in section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 using a textualist approach); Steven R. Salbu, Tipper Credibility,
Noninformational Tippee Trading and Abstention from Trading: An Analysis of Gaps in the Insider
Trading Laws, 68 WASH. L. REV. 307, 345-46 (1993) (arguing for a liberal definition of a
"fraudulent scheme" concept in Rule lOb-5 cases).
26. United States v. Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 997 (5th Cir. 1992).
27. Corsair Capital Partners v. Wedbush Morgan Sec., Inc., 24 F.App'x 795, 797 (9th
Cir. 2001); see also Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 361 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that
the plaintiffs described two types of claims under Rule lOb-5: "disclosure fraud" and
"transaction fraud").
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three bases for liability under Rule 10b-5 must be individually alleged
and proven.2" Again, many of the important terms are undefined in
the 1934 Act and beg for interpretation.2" One thing can be said with
some certainty, however. A mere breach of fiduciary duty does not
satisfy this Rule lOb-5 element.3
0
Where allegations of manipulation or deception involve misstate-
ments or omissions of material facts, litigants must contend with the
meaning of the word "material." The judicially constructed definition
of "material" under Rule 10b-5 consists of two alternative standards. A
misstated or omitted fact is material if there is "a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making
an investment decision. 3 1 Alternatively, an omitted fact is material if
there is "a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having signifi-
candy altered the 'total mix' of information made available."3 2 Subse-
quent decisional law has construed these alternative standards in
various contexts.
3 3
2. "In Connection with" the Purchase or Sale of a Security.-Federal
courts have advanced a number of legal standards defining the Rule
10b-5 requirement that the subject manipulation or deception occur
"in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security. 34 The require-
28. "[W]here the sole basis ... is alleged MISREPRESENTATIONS OR OMISSIONS, plaintiffs
have not made out a market MANIPULATION claim under Rule 10-5(a) and (c)." Lentell v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Schnell v. Conseco, Inc., 43
F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
29. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 n.20 (1976) (noting dictionary
definitions for "device" and "contrivance").
30. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-79 (1977).
31. BAsic Inc. v. LEVINSON, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
32. Id. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449).
33. See, e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178 n.6 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[Iun
the context of an efficient market, 'the concept of materiality translates into information
that alters the price of the firm's stock."' (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997)); United States v. Bingham, 992 F.2d 975, 976 (9th Cir.
1993) ("The government would have us adopt two per se rules, ... that falsification of the
identity of a buyer or seller of securities is always material, and.., that officer or director
status is always material. We decline the government's invitation to adopt such per se
rules."); Garcia v. Cordova, 930 F.2d 826, 827 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e find the asset ap-
praisal information here to be immaterial as a matter of law due to its speculative and
unreliable nature . . .. "). See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the
Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 1131 (2003) (analyzing two
hypothetical examples of possible insider trading and discussing numerous cases dealing
with materiality).
34. SeeJennifer O'Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act: If
It Looks Like a Securities Fraud Claim and Acts Like a Securities Fraud Claim, Is It a Securities
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ment is intended to be read broadly.3 5 The U.S. Supreme Court most
recently addressed this element in 2002, finding that "a fraudulent
scheme in which the securities transactions and breaches of fiduciary
duty coincide" satisfies the "in connection with" requirement. 36 More
than thirty years earlier, the Court had construed the "in connection
with" element by stating that the identified manipulation or deception
must at least "touch" the acquisition or disposition of a security. 37 Yet
earlier, the Second Circuit had interpreted the "in connection with"
requirement to encompass manipulative or deceptive conduct on
which a reasonable investor would rely.38 Other courts have embel-
lished the definitional standards adopted in these cases.39 For exam-
ple, some courts are willing to find the requisite connection to a
securities transaction if a proven misstatement of a material fact oc-
curs in a medium calculated to reach investors.4 ° Moreover, although
there must be some relationship between the asserted manipulation
or deception and a securities transaction, alleged misrepresentations
need not relate to the investment value of a particular security to sat-
isfy the "in connection with" element.41
[T]he fraud in question must relate to the nature of the se-
curities, the risks associated with their purchase or sale, or
some other factor with similar connection to the securities
themselves. While the fraud in question need not relate to
Fraud Claim?, 56 ALA. L. REv. 325, 329 (2004) (stating that "the courts have struggled with
the meaning of the 'in connection with' element" and citing to scholars who have com-
mented on this issue).
35. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v.
Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
36. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 (2002).
37. Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 12-13 ("The crux of the present case is that Man-
hattan suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as
an investor."). This formulation has been criticized by some as being too broad a state-
ment of the "in connection with" element. See, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
726 F.2d 930, 942-43 (2d Cir. 1984).
38. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968).
39. See, e.g., Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2005)
(noting various standards adopted by different courts); McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102
F.3d 390, 392-96 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the compatibility of the Texas Gulfstandard
with later cases); Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11 th Cir. 1989) (using
the "touch" test); Sofipoint, 958 F. Supp. at 862 (discussing numerous cases on the "in con-
nection with" requirement); see also O'Hare, supra note 34, at 329-34 (analyzing various
approaches to the "in connection with" requirement).
40. E.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); SEC v. Rana
Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993); In reAmes Dep't Stores Inc. Stock Litig.,
991 F.2d 953, 965 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Leslie Fay Co. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 697
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
41. E.g., Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820; Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d
939, 942 (3d Cir. 1985); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1967).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the investment value of the securities themselves, it must
have more than some tangential relation to the securities
transaction.42
3. Scienter.-As a third core element of Rule lOb-5 claims, fed-
eral prosecutors, the SEC, and private plaintiffs must allege and prove
that the defendant had scienter-a prescribed state of mind.43 Mere
negligence on the part of a defendant is not enough.' Moreover,
allegations and proof of intentional misconduct, while sufficient to
satisfy the scienter requirement, may not be necessary.45 Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ruled expressly on the specific
required level of culpability, federal courts generally acknowledge that
recklessness is sufficient to meet the scienter requirement under Rule
lOb-5. 46 The claimant must establish that the defendant was aware of
the "true state of affairs and appreciated the propensity of his mis-
statement or omission to mislead ' 47 or acted with reckless disregard
for the truth.4' Essentially, scienter is the intent to manipulate or
deceive. 49 This element of a Rule IOb-5 claim is difficult to allege and
prove; evidence of scienter often is circumstantial.5"
42. Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999).
43. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
44. Id. at 214.
45. Warren v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 1984). Some courts do
reference intentionality or "purpose" in articulating the scienter requirement. See, e.g., In
re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("The requisite state of mind, or scienter, in an action under Section 10 (b) and Rule
lOb-5, that the plaintiff must allege is a purpose to harm by intentionally deceiving,
manipulating or defrauding.").
46. E.g., Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 409 (5th Cir. 2001); Hollinger v.
Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (9th Cir. 1990); Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc.,
611 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1980); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1045 (7th Cir. 1977); see also NAGY ET AL., supra note 17, at 110 ("[Elvery federal court of
appeals to confront the question has held recklessness sufficient for these purposes.").
47. PALMITER, supra note 11, at 283; see also AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206
F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2000) (criticizing the district court's opinion on the basis that it
"inappropriately makes the scienter issue one of 'what did the defendant want to happen'
as opposed to 'what could the defendant reasonably foresee as a potential result of his
action'"); SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that
scienter exists when a defendant knows "the nature and consequences of his actions").
48. In reAdvanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999); HAZEN, supra note
10, at 204, 256-61.
49. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 289
F. Supp. 2d at 427 ("[T]he requisite state of mind for actionable securities fraud under
Rule lOb-5 is the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud, not merely the intent to utter
an untruth."); PALMITER, supra note 11, at 282.
50. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983) (noting that
proof of the requisite state of mind in a Rule lOb-5 action "is often a matter of inference
from circumstantial evidence").
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Criminal enforcement under Rule 10b-5 adds an important re-
quirement. To be the subject of successful criminal prosecution
under the 1934 Act, a violation must be willful.5 Although the defini-
tion of the word "willful" in this and other contexts is uncertain,52
recent decisional law under the 1934 Act and other federal statutes
generally indicates that the government must at least show that the
defendant acted with knowledge of the wrongfulness of his conduct
under the law that he is accused of violating. 53
51. 15 U.S.C. § 781f(a) (Supp. II 2002). There is some debate over whether the scien-
ter requirement, as an element of a Rule 10b-5 claim, collapses into or is synonymous with
the willfulness requirement imposed on criminal prosecutions under Rule lOb-5.
While civil actions require scienter and criminal actions require willfulness, it is
unclear whether there is a meaningful distinction between the terms. In other
words, it is debatable whether willfulness in criminal cases requires something
above the ordinary scienter required in civil cases. At least one commentator has
argued that "courts have interpreted the term 'willfully,' as used in [section] 32,
to mean that only ordinary scienter is necessary to support a criminal conviction."
This may be because "[section] 32 was drafted before [section] 10(b) was inter-
preted to require a showing of scienter." Until a court interpreting section 32(a)
addresses the meaning of "willfully" in that provision, this question remains
unresolved.
XueMing Jimmy Cheng et al., Securities Fraud, 41 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 1079, 1088-89 (2004)
(footnotes omitted); see also Michael H. Dessent, Joe Six-Pack, United States v. O'Hagan, and
Private Securities Litigation Reform: A Line Must Be Drawn, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 1137, 1189 (1998)
("[W] illfulness is still defined as knowing conduct."). Professor Margaret Sachs answers
the question simply, logically, and definitively: "The differentiated intent rule applies only
if Congress expected courts to define these civil intent requirements less stringently than
the willfulness requirement for criminal actions." Sachs, supra note 19, at 1054. Sachs
argues Congress had such an expectation from its assumed knowledge of a 1933 Supreme
Court case construing willfulness under the federal tax laws. Id at 1054-55. In the interests
of clarity, the willfulness requirement is set out separately from the scienter element in this
Article.
52. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943) (noting, in a federal income tax
case, that "willful... is a word of many meanings, its construction often being influenced
by its context."); Kelly Koenig Levi, Figure This: Judging or Federal Fraud? A Proposal to
Criminalize Fraudulent Judging and Officiating in the International Figure Skating Arena, 25 HAS-
TINGS COMM. & Ewr. L.J. 97, 114 (2002) (observing, in a discussion of criminal claims
under Rule lOb-5, that "[c]ourts... are not uniform in their determination of the level of
conduct that satisfies 'willful.' Some conclude that specific intent is necessary, while others
hold that recklessness is sufficient." (footnote omitted)).
53. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994) (noting, in a federal
money laundering case, that "the jury had to find he knew [that] the [conduct] in which
he [was] engaged was unlawful."); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (stat-
ing, in a federal tax evasion context, that "[w]illfulness ... requires the Government to
prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty,
and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty"); United States v. Gross, 961
F.2d 1097, 1102 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[C]onviction on the false statements charges required the
government to show that Gross acted with knowledge of the wrongfulness of his actions.");
United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1970) (defining willfulness under section 32
of the 1934 Act as the defendant's realization that his actions were wrongful under the
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A defendant acts willfully when he acts intentionally and de-
liberately and his actions are not the result of an innocent
mistake, negligence, or inadvertence. While proof of specific
intent is not needed, the government must establish that the
defendant had some evil purpose and intended to commit
the prohibited act.
54
B. Elements and Other Special Rules Applicable to Private
Enforcement Actions
In addition to the core elements described in Part I.A, private
plaintiffs claiming violations of Rule 10b-5 must have standing, prove
three additional elements (reliance, causation, and damages), and
meet certain additional requirements, some of which are applicable
only in the class action setting. Although these private action ele-
ments and requirements were not at issue in the Stewart case, a brief
treatment of them here better informs the reader as to the full pano-
ply of options for legal action under Rule lOb-5 and provides addi-
tional foundation for the analysis in Part V.
Courts have imposed a standing requirement for private actions
under Rule lOb-5, mandating that a plaintiff be an actual seller or
purchaser of a security.55 Forbearance-expressly deciding not to en-
gage in a securities transaction as a result of conduct otherwise pro-
scribed under Rule lOb-5, does not satisfy this element of proof.5 6
securities laws "and that the knowingly wrongful act involve a significant risk of effecting
the violation that has occurred"); see also infra note 54 and accompanying text.
54. Cheng et al., supra note 51, at 1088 (footnotes omitted). Under the rule in certain
cases, however, "[p]roof of a specific intent to violate the law is not necessary to uphold a
conviction under § 32(a) of the Act, provided that satisfactory proof is established that the
defendant intended to commit the act prohibited." United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d
499, 509 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Peltz, 433 F.2d at 54 ("A person can willfully violate an SEC
rule even if he does not know of its existence.");James P. Hemmer, Resignation of Corporate
Counsel: Fulfillment or Abdication of Duty, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 641, 644 (1988) (noting, in dis-
cussing criminal actions under Rule lOb-5, that "[a]lthough the term 'willful' has not been
construed uniformly by the courts in criminal cases, generally that element will be satisfied
if the defendant acted voluntarily and intentionally."); William B. Herlands, Criminal Law
Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REv. 139, 148-49 (1934) (recognizing
that criminal prosecution only requires "a realization on the defendant's part that he was
doing a wrongful act"); Levi, supra note 52, at 114 (observing, in a criminal action under
Rule 10b-5, that "[alt minimum, most courts conclude that the defendant must have in-
tended to do a wrongful act, but need not have intended to violate the law." (footnote
omitted)). Some courts indicate that recklessness may be sufficient to support the willful-
ness requirement for criminal prosecutions under the federal securities laws. NAGY ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 839-40; Levi, supra note 52, at 114; Sachs, supra note 19, at 1053, 1055.
55. HAZEN, supra note 10, at 202; PALMITER, supra note 11, at 273; see Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
56. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730-31.
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However, a defendant in a Rule lOb-5 action need not be a seller or
purchaser.
A private action plaintiff also must prove reliance on the alleged
manipulative or deceptive conduct of the defendant. 5 Reliance often
is equated with or described as "transaction causation"-but for the
conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff would not have engaged in the
subject purchase or sale of a security.59 Certain common facts and
circumstances give rise to a presumption of reliance, allowing the
plaintiff to avoid affirmative proof of reliance as an initial burden.6 °
These presumptions of reliance may be rebutted by a defendant, how-
ever, by a showing that refutes the rationale underlying the
presumption.6"
Loss causation is a further important element in private actions
under Rule 10b-5. To satisfy this element, the plaintiff must prove
that, but for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff would not have
suffered the claimed lOSS.6 2 As recently construed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, proof of this element requires proof by the plaintiff that
an actual economic loss has been suffered by him.63 It is not suffi-
cient, for example, that the plaintiff allege and prove that securities
purchased and held by her had an inflated price at the time they were
purchased.6 4
A final element in private actions under Rule lOb-5 is proof of
damages.6 5 A plaintiffs recovery cannot exceed her actual damages.6 6
There is no uniform means of calculating damages for Rule 10b-5
57. Baretge v. Barnett, 553 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[T]he rule does not require
that defendant be the seller of the stock or that plaintiff have purchased the stock from
defendant."); HAZEN, supra note 10, at 207.
58. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
59. E.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 172 (3d
Cir. 2001) ("Reliance, or transaction causation, establishes that but for the fraudulent mis-
representation, the investor would not have purchased or sold the security.").
60. BASIC Inc. v. LEVINSON, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988); Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972).
61. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49; see, e.g., Newton, 259 F.3d at 176;Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d
1155, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2000); Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 738 (lth Cir.
1989); Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1363 (5th Cir. 1988); Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti
Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1987); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 742-43
(11th Cir. 1984); Kramas v. Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 771 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982);
see generally Joseph De Simone, Note, Should Fraud On the Market Theory Extend to the Context
of Newly Issued Securities?, 61 FoRDHAM L. REV. S151, S163 (1993) ("Later cases have inter-
preted the presumption of reliance recognized in Affiliated Ute as rebuttable.").
62. See Newton, 259 F.3d at 173 ("Loss causation demonstrates that the fraudulent mis-
representation actually caused the loss suffered.").
63. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1629, 1631-32 (2005).
64. Id. at 1631-32.
65. Id. at 1631.
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claims.67 Based on the facts and circumstances of his case, a plaintiff
may seek (among other measures of damages) out-of-pocket dam-
ages, 68 contract damages,6 9 or rescissory damages.7 ° Rescission also
may be an available remedy.71
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000) ("[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for dam-
ages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction ofjudgment in
one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act
complained of."); PALMITER, supra note 11, at 287.
67. HAZEN, supra note 10, at 379; Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Compensatory
Damages in Rule lOb-5 Actions: Pragmatic Justice or Chaos?, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 1083, 1084
(2000) ("[T]here is no clear rule guiding the measure of damages under Rule IOb-5 and
hence little predictability for counsel or the client.").
68. PALMITER, supra note 11, at 288. Out-of-pocket losses (damages actually and proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's violative conduct) are the most common measure of
damages in Rule 1Ob-5 cases and typically are equal to the difference between the fair value
of what the plaintiff received and the fair value of what the plaintiff would have received
had there been no violative conduct. Id.; see also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972); Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 742-43 (11th Cir. 1989);
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
69. PALMITER, supra note 11, at 288-89. Contract damages, also known as "benefit of
the bargain" damages or referenced as damages calculated under a "loss of the bargain"
rule, allow the plaintiff to recover his or her loss of the benefit of the bargain in contrac-
tual transactions. McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm't, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir.
1995); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 1982); Norte & Co. v. Huf-
fines, 288 F. Supp. 855, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969).
70. PALMITER, supra note 11, at 288. Rescissory damages attempt to put the plaintiff in
the same financial position the plaintiff would be in if the transaction were rescinded by,
for example, allowing a plaintiff-seller to recover the purchaser's profits (profit disgorge-
ment) or a plaintiff-purchaser to recover the difference between her purchase and resale
price. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965); Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
135 F. Supp. 176, 186-94 (D. Del. 1955), modified on another point and affd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d
Cir. 1956). Generally, rescissory damages only are appropriate when rescission has been
made impossible (because, for example, stock bought or sold by the plaintiff has been
resold). See Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1979) ("If the defendant no
longer owns the stock or it is otherwise unavailable because of a merger or other interven-
ing event, then the court may award rescissory damages to place the plaintiff in the same
financial position he would have been were it possible to return the stock.").
71. Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974) ("The plaintiffs are .. .request-
ing ... rescission and are simply seeking the recovery of the amounts paid for their stock.
This is an appropriate remedy under sections 10(b) and 17...."); PALMiTER, supra note 11,
at 287; Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lOb-5: A Restitution Alterna-
tive to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349, 367 (1984) ("When courts recognized the exis-
tence of private causes of action under rule 10b-5, most courts also acknowledged that a
rule lOb-5 plaintiff could seek rescission instead of pursuing an action for damages.").
Rescission is an equitable remedy that restores the parties to a transaction to their respec-
tive positions before the transaction. The remedy consists of unwinding the purchase and
sale transaction between the parties, resulting in (a) a plaintiff-seller getting her stock back
in exchange for the purchase price, or (b) a plaintiff-purchaser returning the stock she
purchased in exchange for the purchase price she paid. See Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 554
("Rescission is the avoidance or undoing of the transaction. Its purpose is to return the
defrauded purchaser to the status quo ante; it contemplates the return of the injured party
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Moreover, cases brought as private securities actions under fed-
eral law have their own set of applicable procedural rules. Over ten
years ago, private actions (including class actions) brought under
Rule 10b-5 became subject to significant additional requirements as a
result of the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PSLRA).72 Among these additional requirements are certain
more stringent pleading standards. As a result of the PSLRA, for ex-
ample, a private plaintiff alleging one or more material misstatements
or misleading omissions in violation of Rule lOb-5 must specifically set
forth, among other things, each statement or OMISSION and explain
why any OMISSION is misleading. 73 Moreover, private plaintiffs bring-
ing Rule lOb-5 claims now must allege facts "with particularity" that
give rise to a "strong inference" that the defendant acted with the req-
uisite scienter. ' A damage cap also is provided in the PSLRA.v5
C. Applicable Burdens of Proof
As a final general matter, it is significant to note that the burden
of proof in criminal and civil actions under Rule 10b-5 is different.
Criminal allegations in Rule 10b-5 actions, like those in other criminal
prosecutions, must be proven by the government beyond a reasonable
doubt.76 Although no single, simple definition of the standard ex-
ists, 7 7 "[t]he standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt means
to the position he occupied before he was wrongfully induced to enter the transaction.").
Generally, rescission only is appropriate when the parties to the transaction are litigants
and when their positions have not changed significantly since the transaction took place.
Id. at 554-55.
72. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000); In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 741-42
(8th Cir. 2002).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2); In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d at 745.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e); PALMITER, supra note 11, at 287. In any event, section 28(a)
of the 1934 Act limits a plaintiffs recovery to "actual damages." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a); see
supra note 66 and accompanying text.
76. See Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466, 476-77 (2000) (tracing the requirement to roots
in constitutional due process and rights of the accused); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 510 (1995) (same).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 728 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Reasonable
doubt is not an easy concept to understand, and it is all the more difficult to explain.");
Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving Meaning to a Critical Concept,
22 AM. J. CIuM. L. 677, 682-88 (1995) (documenting the many different approaches to
defining the standard); James Joseph Duane, What Message Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors
When We Ask Them to "Send a Message" with Their Verdict?, 22 AM.J. CRIM. L. 565, 665 (1995)
("The words 'beyond a reasonable doubt' are notoriously obscure and are 'not self-
defining for jurors.'"); Thomas V. Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in the World Is It Defined?,
12 Am. U.J. IN-r'L L. & POL'Y 195, 213-25 (1997) (examining alternative definitions and
recommending approaches to better defining the standard).
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proof to a virtual certainty."" Civil actions under Rule lOb-5, whether
public or private, need only be proven by the SEC or a private plaintiff
by a preponderance of the evidence.79 Although numerous defini-
tions of this standard also exist," in essence, "[t]he standard of pre-
ponderance of the evidence translates into more-likely-than-not."8 '
Like the substantive elements, the burden of proof in a Rule lOb-5
action may impact the exercise of enforcement discretion, the deter-
mination of motions, and the final outcome in a case.
II. THE EVIDENCE: UNITED STATES V. MARTHA STEWART
This Part briefly reviews the evidence that led to the indictment
of Martha Stewart for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 and the facts
adduced at trial that resulted in Stewart being acquitted of that charge
by the judge on Stewart's motion. The summary presented in this
Part is based solely on the Indictment and the court's opinion grant-
78. Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof 50 AM.
J. COMP. L. 243, 251 (2002); see a/soJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) ("[B]y
impressing upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the
guilt of the accused, the standard symbolizes the significance that our society attaches to
the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself."); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1293-94 (8th ed.
2004) (DEFINING "reasonable doubt" as "[t]he doubt that prevents one from being firmly
convinced of a defendant's guilt, or the belief that there is a real possibility that a defen-
dant is not guilty"); Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales ofJustice Through National Puni-
tive Damage Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1573, 1618 (1997) ("The purpose of criminal law is to
punish and deter (retributive), using a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' burden of proof,
which MEANS that the prosecutor must prove that there is no reasonable question that the
defendant committed the act."); Lawrence M. Solan, Convicting the Innocent Beyond a Reason-
able Doubt: Some Lessons About Jury Instructions from the Sheppard Case, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
465, 473 (2001) ("The expression 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' is means for accom-
plishing an end-the requirement that a person should not be convicted unless the gov-
ernment proves its case to 'near certitude."').
79. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-88 (1983).
80. Matthew Stohl, False Light Invasion of Privacy in Docudramas: The Oxymoron Which
Must Be Solved, 35 AKRON L. REv. 251, 254 n.13 (2002) ("'[P]reponderance of the evidence'
is ... subject to numerous definitions.").
81. Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 78, at 251; see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c) (2) (2005)
(defining the standard to mean "[t]he degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable per-
son, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
fact is more likely to be true than untrue"); Cohen, supra note 77, at 693 (defining the
standard as "more likely than not"); Vern R. Walker, Restoring the Individual Plaintiff to Tort
Law by Rejecting "Junk Logic" About Specific Causation, 56 ALA. L. REv. 381, 460 (2004)
("Courts have interpreted this phrase as MEANING 'more likely than not,' 'probably true,' or
'more probably true than false.' The 'weight' or 'convincing force' or 'probative value' of
the evidence supporting the finding must be 'greater than' the weight of evidence against
the finding.").
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ing Stewart's acquittal.8 2 The summary is organized on the basis of
the three core Rule lOb-5 elements, as set forth in Part I.
A. Manipulation or Deception
The government's case as to manipulation or deception, as ex-
pressed in its contentions in the Indictment, is built around four pub-
lic statements made by or on behalf of Stewart in June 2002.88 In each
case, the Indictment asserts that the statements made constituted mis-
representations of material facts or that material facts omitted from
those statements rendered the statements misleading. 4
1. Statement Released on June 7, 2002 in the Wall Street Journal.-
First, Stewart's legal counsel made a statement to the Wall Street Journal
on Stewart's behalf on June 6, 2002 that was published by the Wall
Street Journal on June 7, 2002.85 The Indictment avers that this state-
ment includes misrepresentations and conceals the material fact that
Stewart had traded her ImClone shares after having been informed
that ImClone president and chief executive officer Samuel Waksal
and members of his family were selling or attempting to sell their Im-
Clone shares.8 6 The statement offers that Stewart sold her ImClone
shares because of a "stop loss" order that authorized and directed the
sale of her shares "if the stock ever went less than $60."87 The Indict-
ment asserts that the materiality of the alleged false and omitted facts
derives from the fact that "STEWART's reputation, as well as the likeli-
hood of any criminal or regulatory action against STEWART, were ma-
terial to MSLO's shareholders because of the negative impact that any
82. These facts are, therefore, incomplete. The judge in the Stewart case expressly
noted that her opinion did not include all of the facts presented at trial. United States v.
Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 371 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). A summary of this kind optimally
would be based on a thorough review of the trial transcript. However, a review of the
Indictment and the court's opinion granting Stewart's motion of acquittal are sufficient for
the purposes intended to be served by this Article, which assume the accuracy of the facts
presented in these documents. In any event, there apparently were few disagreements
between the prosecution and the defense on the facts proven at trial, other than the key
dispute on the accuracy of Stewart's stated reason for selling her ImClone shares.
83. Indictment, supra note 2, 60. Both the Indictment and the court's opinion on
Stewart's motion for acquittal reference three statements, but the information in these
statements was publicly disseminated by Stewart four times. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. 61.
86. Id.; see id. 15-17 (recounting the government's allegations regarding the con-
cealed facts).
87. Id. 61 (quoting Chris Adams & Geeta Anand, Martha Stewart Sold ImClone Shares-
Timing Raises Questions, but There Is No Indication She Knew of FDA's Decision, WALL ST. J., June
7, 2002, at B2).
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such action or damage to her reputation could have on the company
which [sic] bears her name "8.... 8 In support of this materiality the-
ory, the Indictment quotes a statement from the MSLO initial public
offering prospectus (filed with the SEC in 1999)89 and also notes an
initial MSLO stock price drop after the public announcement of Stew-
art's sale of her ImClone shares.90
The court's opinion granting Stewart's motion for acquittal indi-
cates that the government essentially proved the timing and content
of the events relating to the June 7, 2002 Wall Street Journal article at
trial.9 1 Because the court's opinion on the motion for acquittal fo-
cuses on the issue of scienter, the court does not summarize in its
opinion the evidence supporting the government's contention that
this statement was, in fact, false or misleading.9 2 As to materiality, the
court notes the introduction into evidence of the initial public offer-
ing prospectus at trial9" and finds the related facts to be as stated in
the Indictment.94 The court also finds that evidence was introduced
at trial that substantiates the government's contention in the Indict-
ment with respect to the effect of the first public disclosure of Stew-
art's December 2001 ImClone stock trade on MSLO's stock price. 95
2. June 12, 2002 Press Release.-The second statement referenced
in the Indictment is a June 12, 2002 public announcement that Stew-
art prepared and caused to be issued.96 Again, the Indictment alleges
that this statement contains false information and conceals the mate-
rial fact that Stewart had traded her ImClone shares after having been
told that Samuel Waksal and members of his family were selling or
attempting to sell their ImClone shares.97 This statement includes:
more detailed facts about the alleged $60 "stop loss" order relating to
Stewart's ImClone shares; information about related communications




91. See United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 371, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (setting
forth the relevant facts that the jury could find from the evidence presented at trial).
92. For purposes of the motion, the court assumes that the statements are false. Id. at
371 n.1.
93. Id. at 372.
94. Compare id. at 371-74 (establishing the relevant facts for purposes of the securities
fraud charges against Stewart), with Indictment, supra note 2, 9 57-64 (setting forth the
factual allegations of the government).
95. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 372-73.
96. Indictment, supra note 2, 91 62-63.
97. Id. 63.
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that she did not have nonpublic information about ImClone when she
sold her ImClone shares.98 The materiality of the misrepresented and
omitted facts in this June 12, 2002 statement is supported by the same
allegations in the Indictment that support the materiality of the facts
included in and omitted from the June 7, 2002 statement.99
In finding the facts adduced at trial, the court's opinion granting
Stewart's motion for acquittal quotes the June 12, 2002 press release,
substantiating the government's allegations about the date and sub-
stance of this statement. 100 Again, the court does not summarize in its
opinion the evidence supporting the government's contention that
the June 12, 2002 statement was false or misleading, since this conten-
tion was not at issue in Stewart's motion for acquittal. 0 1 The court's
findings as to the materiality of the June 7, 2002 statement also apply
to the materiality of the June 12, 2002 statement. 10 2
3. June 18, 2002 Press Release Read by Stezwart at a June 19, 2002
Conference.-The third statement referenced in the Indictment was
prepared, approved, and caused to be issued by Stewart on June 18,
2002, on the eve of a speech scheduled to be given by Stewart on June
19th.1"' The occasion of the speaking engagement was a conference
for securities analysts and investors.10 4 According to the Indictment,
Stewart's June 18, 2002 statement asserted that her June 12, 2002
statement explained the facts relating to the sale of her ImClone
shares and that the sale of her ImClone shares was based on publicly
available information.105 The Indictment also avers that, in the June
18, 2002 statement, Stewart repeats her assertion that she sold her Im-
Clone shares in accordance with a prior agreement with her broker
that the shares be sold once the per share price of ImClone's common
stock fell below $60 and states that she cooperated completely with
the SEC and the U.S. Attorney's office. 10 6 Stewart read the June 18,
2002 statement at the June 19, 2002 conference.107 According to the
Indictment, the June 18, 2002 statement includes misrepresentations
and conceals the same information that the June 7, 2002 and June 12,
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
100. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 373-74.
101. The court does, however, note the facts in the press release that the government
alleges to be false. Id. at 374 n.2.
102. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.







2002 statements conceal. 10 8 The government alleges that the facts in-
cluded in and omitted from these statements are material on the same
bases as those included in and omitted from the June 7, 2002
statement. 109
In its opinion acquitting Stewart, the judge summarizes the facts
found about the June 18, 2002 statement by noting that "[a]fter the
close of business on June 18, 2002, Stewart issued a third statement
that essentially repeated the June 12 statement, only adding that she
was cooperating fully with the investigations."110 Without addressing
the truth or completeness of the June 18, 2002 press release, 11 the
court also finds that it had been read by Stewart at the June 19, 2002
conference, "a forum for the executives of media corporations to up-
date the investment community about their ... financial health." 1 2
The opinion further states that the conference was "attended prima-
rily by securities analysts and portfolio managers" and that "[i] nvestors
were also present."'1 3 The materiality of the facts represented in and
omitted from the June 18, 2002 public announcement may be as-
sessed on the basis of the same facts found in the trial court's opinion
that support the materiality of the June 7, 2002 statement.114
B. "In Connection with" the Purchase or Sale of a Security
The representations and allegations in the Indictment support-
ing the claim that any manipulative or deceptive conduct by Stewart
was in connection with the purchase or sale of a security are somewhat
skimpy and conclusory. The government's case emanates from the
status of MSLO as a public company. The Indictment represents that
"MSLO's common stock was listed and traded on the New York Stock
Exchange . . . under the symbol 'MSO." 1 5 The Indictment further
alleges that Stewart made or caused someone to make the four alleg-
edly false and misleading statements relating to the sale of her Im-
Clone shares "to defraud and deceive purchasers and sellers of MSLO
common stock and to maintain the value of her own MSLO stock by
108. Id. 64; see supra notes 86 & 97 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
110. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
111. See supra notes 92 & 101 and accompanying text. The government's allegations as
to the falsity of Stewart's various representations in the June 18, 2002 statement are, how-
ever, summarized in a footnote to the court's opinion. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 375 n.3.
112. Id. at 374.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
115. Indictment, supra note 2, 1.
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preventing a decline in the market price of MSLO's stock,"' 1 6 tying
Stewart's asserted misrepresentations to purchase and sale transac-
tions occurring in the public market for MSLO common stock.
In granting Stewart's motion for acquittal on the Rule lOb-5
charge, the trial judge notes and evaluates evidence that reflected the
public company status of MSLO.1 17 The court's opinion also refer-
ences evidence that would allow a reasonable jury inference regarding
the possible and actual impact that public statements and other pub-
licly available information may have and have had on the public mar-
ket for MSLO's common stock."1 8 The court does not, however, find
that the evidence adduced by the government at trial supports a rea-
sonable jury inference that Stewart actually intended to deceive public
investors in MSLO in making the June 7, 2002, June 12, 2002, and
June 18, 2002 statements. 1 9 In fact, the court notes evidence to the
contrary in the text of its opinion.1
20
C. Scienter
The evidence of scienter set forth in the Indictment is circum-
stantial. The essential story that the Indictment tells begins with the
fact that Stewart, based on her knowledge and experience as a public
company chairman and chief executive officer, licensed stock broker,
and New York Stock Exchange director, knew of the effects that pub-
lic statements have on a public company's stock price.1 2 ' In addition,
according to the Indictment, Stewart owned or had the option of ac-
quiring a substantial percentage of MSLO's publicly traded common
stock.12 2 Based on that knowledge, experience, and stock position,
the story continues, Stewart made false and misleading statements to
the public about the reasons for the sale of her ImClone shares "in an
effort to stop or at least slow the steady erosion of MSLO's stock price
caused by investor concerns. '1 23 Moreover, Stewart allegedly made
these statements "with the intent to defraud and deceive purchasers
116. Id. 60. The Indictment also alleges that Stewart's public misrepresentations were
made "in an effort to stop or at least slow the steady erosion of MSLO's stock price caused
by investor concerns." Id.
117. See Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (noting that Stewart was the CEO of a public
company and referencing the market price of MSLO's stock).
118. Id. at 372-73.
119. Id. at 370.
120. See id. at 375 n.4 (stating that a temporary rebound in MSLO's stock price is not
evidence of Stewart's intent); id. at 377 (setting forth the court's interpretation of Stewart's
statements at the June 19, 2002 conference).





and sellers of MSLO common stock and to maintain the value of her
own MSLO stock by preventing a decline in the market price of
MSLO's stock." '2 4 The Indictment provides no additional, specific
factual support for these allegations of purpose and intent.
The scienter-related facts set forth by the court in its opinion on
Stewart's motion for acquittal are too numerous to set forth in full
here, 115 but they parallel to a substantial extent the statement of the
government's case in the Indictment. The inferences that the court
finds permissible on the basis of those facts include:
" "that Stewart had a significant financial stake in MSLO";' 2 6
" "that Stewart was aware of the market price of her company's
stock and of matters that could affect the price of that stock"; 12 7
" "that Stewart was aware of the importance of her reputation to
the continued health of MSLO";12 1
* "that Stewart believed that the price of MSLO was falling in
response to the negative publicity about the investigations" of
Stewart in connection with the sale of her ImClone shares; 129
and
" "that some MSLO executives had concerns about the effect of
the negative publicity on the company's business that were not
immediately tied to the falling stock price."13
Importantly, however, the court finds that the prosecution's case
was fundamentally flawed in that "the Government . . . offered no
evidence that Stewart evinced a concern for the price of MSLO stock
124. Id.
125. Circumstantial evidence of intent typically derives from all of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the defendant's actionable conduct that are presented and proven at
trial. See, e.g., United States v. Lenertz, 63 F.App'x 704, 709 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Fraudulent
intent may be established by circumstantial evidence and by inferences deduced from facts
and situations. Similarly, fraudulent intent may be inferred from the totality of the circum-
stances and need not be proven by direct evidence." (citations omitted)); United States v.
Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1543 (7th Cir. 1996) ("An intent to defraud may be established by
circumstantial evidence and by inferences from the facts and circumstances surrounding
the scheme."); United States v. Aubrey, 878 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Proof of intent
may arise by inference from all of the facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction.");
United States v. One 1951 Chevrolet, 130 F. Supp. 777, 779 (D. Ky. 1955) ("Intent may be
inferred as a matter of circumstantial evidence from the facts surrounding each case.").
Accordingly, courts generally look to all of the significant facts proven in a case in deter-
mining scienter.
126. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 371-72.
127. Id. at 372.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 373.
130. Id.
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at any time during the relevant period" 131 and that no reasonable in-
ferences of intent could be drawn in this regard from the evidence
adduced at trial.
13 2
III. CHARGING MARTHA STEWART WITH SECURITIES FRAUD:
A GOOD THING?1 3 3
Should Martha Stewart have been charged with securities fraud?
The answer to this question requires a review of the facs underlying
Stewart's case in light of prosecutorial discretion (as informed by stan-
dards and guidance applicable to federal criminal prosecutions), the
elements of a Rule 1Ob-5 charge, and (to a limited extent) the burden
of proof in a criminal action. This analysis assumes that Stewart mis-
represented the reason for selling her ImClone shares on December
22, 2001.
A. Factors in the Prosecutorial Decision to Charge
Prosecutors have the power and discretion to determine both
whether and with what a possible criminal defendant will be
charged."' Federal prosecutorial decisions to charge are subject to
professional responsibility standards and U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) guidelines, as well as formal and informal policies imple-
mented by individual U.S. Attorneys offices.1 35 From an ethical stand-
131. Id. at 376.
132. Id. at 376-78.
133. The trademark for "Good Things" is registered in the name of MSLO. U.S.
Trademark Registration No. 2947861 (registered May 10, 2005), available at http://www.
uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm (follow "SEARCH trademarks" hyperlink; then follow
"Structured Form Search (Boolean)" hyperlink; then search "Registration Number" field
for "2947861"). MSLO also has applied for a service mark for "Good Things." U.S.
Trademark Serial No. 78386149 (filed Mar. 17, 2004), available at id. (follow "SEARCH
trademarks" hyperlink; then follow "Structured Form Search (Boolean)" hyperlink; then
search "Serial Number" field for "78386149"). The trademark for "A Good Thing" was
filed by another applicant and abandoned. U.S. Trademark Serial No. 78080819
(abandoned Sept. 6, 2002), available at id. (follow "SEARCH trademarks" hyperlink; then
follow "Structured Form Search (Boolean)" hyperlink; then search "Serial Number" field
for "78080819").
134. R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUToR1AL ETHICS 13-14 (2005); Moohr, supra note 4, at
177 ("The power of the prosecutor to charge is two-fold; the power to indict or not.., and
the power to decide what offenses to charge."). The charges in an indictment are the
result of a grand jury process. Use of the terms "prosecution" and "government" in this
Article in reference to the charging in the Stewart case therefore generally includes both
the grand jury and the U.S. Attorneys.
135. CASSIDY, supra note 134, at 14-24; Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the
Prosecutor's Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 FoR-HAMI URB. L.J. 513, 513 (1993) ("Vari-
ous legal, political, experiential, and ethical considerations inform and guide the charging
decision." (footnotes omitted)); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 Am. J.
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point, Rule 3.8 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) provides that "[t]he PROSECUTOR
in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a CHARGE THAT
THE PROSECUTOR knows is not supported by probable cause."1 3 6 Simi-
larly, DR 7-103(A) of the American Bar Association's Model Code of
Professional Responsibility states that "[a] public PROSECUTOR or other
government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted crimi-
nal CHARGES when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not
supported by probable cause.' 37 Each of these professional conduct
rules relies heavily on the elusive definition of probable cause.13 All
of the states and the District of Columbia have adopted a version of
one of these rules."3 Federal prosecutors are subject to the rules of
the state or territory in which they practice. 4 °
Supplemental to these professional responsibility and conduct
rules, the DOJ has adopted Principles of Federal Prosecution (Princi-
ples) applicable to U.S. Attorneys that are set forth in the U.S. Attor-
neys' Manual. T  The Principles include a number of rules applicable
to prosecution and charging decisions. For example, under the Prin-
COMP. L. 643, 650-52 (2002) (outlining various sources of prosecutorial guidance). Prose-
cutors generally also are guided in their charging decisions by the American Bar Associa-
tion Standards for Criminal Justice. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9 (Am. Bar
Ass'n, 3d ed. 1993), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc-blk.
html; see also Krug, supra, at 651 (noting that certain professional organizations have
adopted model charging standards); Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prose-
cutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1511, 1517-18 (2000) (discussing the
charging guidelines developed by the ABA).
136. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2000), available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpc/rule_3_8.html.
137. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1980), available at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/mcpr.pdf.
138. CASSIDY, supra note 134, at 15-16; see also Binegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175 (1949) ("'The substance of all the DEFINITIONS' OF PROBABLE CAUSE 'is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt.'" (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925));
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 1239 (DEFINING "PROBABLE CAUSE" as "[a] reason-
able ground to suspect that a person has committed ... a crime"); George Fisher, The Jury's
Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE LJ. 575, 579 (1997) ("The sworn testimony of a named witness
who is not obviously delusional is all the PROSECUTOR needs to satisfy probable cause.").
139. Krug, supra note 135, at 652. In New York, where the Stewart case was prosecuted,
the applicable professional conduct provision is Disciplinary Rule 7-103 of the New York
Code of Professional Responsibility. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, LAWYER'S CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103 (2002); see also People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Bd. of
Sup'rs, 167 N.E. 204, 208 (N.Y. 1929) ("An action for malicious prosecution cannot be
sustained if there was probable cause for the criminal prosecution, although it was mali-
ciously commenced.").
140. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000) (known as the "McDade Amendment").
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ciples, a federal prosecutor is required to have "probable cause to be-
lieve that a person has committed a Federal offense within his/her
jurisdiction" before he or she can "[c] ommence or recommend prose-
cution."'1 4 2 This rule reinforces the ethical mandates of the Model
Rules and the Model Code by using a "probable cause" standard.
Moreover,
[t] he attorney for the government should commence or rec-
ommend Federal prosecution if he/she believes that the per-
son's conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the
admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and
sustain a conviction, unless, in his/her judgment, prosecu-
tion should be declined because:
1. No substantial Federal interest would be served by
prosecution;
2. The person is subject to effective prosecution in another
jurisdiction; or
3. There exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to
prosecution."'
The Principles also specify certain matters that a federal prosecutor
should not consider when commencing or recommending prosecu-
tion.'44 Finally, "once the decision to prosecute has been made, the
attorney for the government should charge, or should recommend
that the grand jury charge, the most serious offense that is consistent
with the nature of the defendant's conduct, and that is likely to result
in a sustainable conviction."' 45 Additional charges only should be
142. Id. at 9-27.200; see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense DE-
FINED by statute, the decision whether or not to PROSECUTE, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
143. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 141, at 9-27.220. The Principles go on to define
each of the three reasons for declining to bring charges against a prospective criminal
defendant. Id. at 9-27.230, 9-27.240, 9-27.250.
144. The relevant Principle states that
[i]n determining whether to commence or recommend prosecution or take
other action against a person, the attorney for the government should not be
influenced by:
1. The person's race, religion, sex, national origin, or political association, activi-
ties or beliefs;
2. The attorney's own personal feelings concerning the person, the person's asso-
ciates, or the victim; or
3. The possible affect of the decision on the attorney's own professional or per-
sonal circumstances.
Id. at 9-27.260; seeRobert H.Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31J. AM. INST. CRiM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 3, 5 (1940) (addressing the Second Annual Conference of United States
Attorneys).
145. ArTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 141, at 9-27.300.
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filed when, in the government attorney's judgment, the additional
charges:
1. Are necessary to ensure that the information or
indictment:
a. Adequately reflects the nature and extent of the crimi-
nal conduct involved; and
b. Provides the basis for an appropriate sentence under
all the circumstances of the case; or
2. Will significantly enhance the strength of the govern-
ment's case against the defendant or a codefendant.146
The Principles are supplemented from time to time by clarifying pro-
nouncements, including internal memoranda from the U.S. Attorney
General.147 Also, individual offices of the U.S. Attorneys typically have
their own guidelines, formal and informal.1 4
146. Id. at 9-27.320.
147. E.g., Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, to All
Federal Prosecutors, Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposi-
tion of Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://news.lp.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft92203chrgmem.pdf ("It is the policy of the Department ofJustice
that, in all federal criminal cases [subject to a number of important exceptions], federal
prosecutors must charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses
that are supported by the facts of the case ....").
148. See Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future ofJudicial Federalism: "Neither Out Far nor In
Deep, "45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 705, 749 (1995) ("The Department ofJustice and the typical
U.S. Attorney's Office have written prosecution guidelines, often labelled 'declination poli-
cies,' that describe principles for informed exercise of federal prosecutorial discretion.");
Roger Conner et al., The Office of U.S. Attorney and Public Safety: A Brief History Prepared for the
"Changing Role of U.S. Attorneys' Offices in Public Safety" Symposium, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 753,
770 (2000) ("U.S. Attorneys' offices have guidelines for individual prosecutions."); Krug,
supra note 135, at 650 ("[ L] ocal PROSECUTORIAL offices have formally adopted written STAN-
DARDS."). This decentralization has been in existence for decades. SeeJackson, supra note
144, at 3-4 ("Your responsibility in your several districts for law enforcement and for its
methods cannot be wholly surrendered to Washington .... It is an unusual and rare
instance in which the local District Attorney should be superseded in the handling of litiga-
tion ...."). Office declination policies are not generally matters of public record. See
Seigel & Slobogin, supra note 5, at 1110 n.12 ("Generally speaking, DOJ's prosecutorial
guidelines, found in the United States Attorney's Manual, are open to the public, but of-
fice-by-office intake guidelines are not."); Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Disci-
pline, 45 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 675, 739 (2003) ("Nonenforcement policies ordinarily are
kept secret."). Moreover, they are not fixed or firm rules under which prosecutors are
bound to operate. See Michael Edmund O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don't: Trends in Federal
Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 240-42 (2003). While publicizing
declination policies (or the reasons for declination in specific cases) would better inform
the defense bar, defendants, and the public at large (potentially affording the public more
confidence in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion), disclosure also may have undesir-
able impacts on criminal behavior by those attempting to avoid prosecution. See Michael
Edmund O'Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Pre-
dictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1439, 1490-91 (2004). Similarly, formalizing fixed decli-
nation rules may have advantages and disadvantages. See id. at 1491-93.
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These ethical standards and elements of professional guidance
do not, however, provide dispositive guidance and are subject to sig-
nificant interpretation.'49 Within the contours of these ethical and
professional mandates, determinations of whether and what to charge
are made based on the elements of applicable crimes and the then
available facts,'15  in the context of broad, but not open-ended,
prosecutorial discretion. 15' The constraints may be, among other
things, constitutional, practical, and moral.' 52 However, judicial chal-
149. See Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 558 (1999) ("[Clharging decisions take place
in a gap in the rules-a gap intentionally left so that prosecutors can tailor justice. In
order to fill the gap, prosecutors must apply both a practical sense of what is right and a
moral standard." (footnote omitted)).
150. The resulting analyses are complex.
If deciding how to charge a case were as simple as reading a statute and deciding
whether its elements might apply to the defendant's behavior, then new prosecu-
tors who have demonstrated their academic acuity should be equipped to handle
the task. Experienced prosecutors know, however, that the charging decision is
much more complicated. The difficulty comes in evaluating those factors that are
not defined by statute, including the severity of the crime, the defendant's role in
the crime, the defendant's past and possible future cooperation, injury to the
victim, complexity in trying the case and the likelihood of success.
Id. at 559.
151. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("In our criminal justice system,
the Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute."); Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) ("There is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our
country's legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both
individual and institutional abuse. And broad though that discretion may be, there are
undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise." (footnote omitted)); Gershman, supra
note 135, at 513 ("The prosecutor's decision to institute criminal charges is the broadest
and least regulated power in American criminal law. Thejudicial deference shown to pros-
ecutors generally is most noticeable with respect to the charging function."); Krug, supra
note 135, at 646 ("PRosEcUTORs enjoy something close to a monopoly on the use of
prosecutorial authority."); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An
Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 608-09 (2005)
("Federal criminal law gives U.S. Attorneys and their assistants an enormous range of
charging options: The scope of responsibility may be small, but jurisdiction is quite large.
The combination means that federal prosecutors have both the time and the authority to
do what they want .... "). Ellen Podgor ably summarizes the state of prosecutorial
discretion.
Prosecutorial discretion is a reality. Its existence has been consistently endorsed
by the United States Supreme Court. Although Congress has recently extended
the application of ethical rules to federal prosecutors, these rules do not directly
supervise a prosecutor's discretionary decisions. Further, discretionary decisions
will seldom reach a level of being "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith" to warrant
a monetary award under the Hyde Amendment.
Podgor, supra note 135, at 1511-12 (footnotes omitted).
152. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 ("[T]he decision to prosecute may not be 'deliberately based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,' in-
cluding the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights. It is appropriate to
judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards." (cita-
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lenges to charging decisions are rarely successful.153 Claims of bias or
selective prosecution are particularly difficult to prove and are judi-
cially disfavored.154
Moreover, compliance with the applicable ethical standards and
professional guidance may not be actively monitored or enforced in
practice. Both policing and enforcement, to the extent that either
exists, are handled by the DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibil-
ity.1" Significantly, defendants may not have a cause of action based
on a prosecutor's violation of these applicable standards and guide-
lines.15 6 In fact, the Principles themselves ordain this status. 157
tion omitted)); Gershman, supra note 135, at 513 nn.3-5 (recognizing that prosecutorial
discretion is constrained by legal, political, and experimental considerations in making
charging decisions); id. at 522 ("My objective is... to provoke inquiry into the degree of
moral confidence that a prosecutor should have before bringing criminal charges. My
thesis is that the prosecutor should engage in a moral struggle over charging decisions,
and should not mechanically initiate charges."); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 276 (2001) ("Prosecutions cannot be based upon race, religion,
the exercise of rights, or other arbitrary classifications. It is difficult, however, for defend-
ants to prove such constitutional violations." (footnote omitted)); Eric L. Muller, Constitu-
tional Conscience, 83 B.U. L. REv. 1017, 1070-71 (2003) ("It is... well settled that ajudge has
the power to dismiss a criminal charge on the basis that it was unconstitutionally vindictive
or selective." (footnotes omitted)).
153. See CAsslDY, supra note 134, at 20-24; Gershman, supra note 135, at 513 ("Limited
constitutional and statutory constraints on charging are manifested in the presumption of
prosecutorial good faith, and are reflected in the courts' acknowledgment that they lack
the knowledge and expertise to supervise the prosecutor's exercise of discretion.").
154. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) ("[T]he conscious exercise of some
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation."); CAssIDy, supra
note 134, at 23 ("[A] presumption of legality attaches to a prosecutor's charging deci-
sions."); Muller, supra note 152, at 1071 ("Allegations of vindictive and selective prosecu-
tion are legion, but successful claims are exceedingly rare. Courts have also drastically
limited the ability of criminal defendants to get discovery to support a claim of impermissi-
bly selective prosecution." (footnote omitted)); Podgor, supra note 135, at 1518-19 ("De-
spite studies tending to show that prosecutors have exhibited bias in some of their
charging decisions, courts have been reluctant to scrutinize the prosecutorial decision-
making process." (footnote omitted)). In sum,
"[t]o obtain discovery on a selective prosecution claim, a defendant must offer
,some evidence' of discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent." In order to
prove selective prosecution, a defendant must prove that similarly situated indi-
viduals were not prosecuted and that he was singled out for prosecution on arbi-
trary grounds. The Court has set a high threshold of proof for these cases and
gives a "presumption of regularity" to prosecutorial decisions ....
Griffin, supra note 152, at 276 (footnotes omitted).
155. Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing 'Discretionary Justice," 13
CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 186-89 (2004).
156. Cf United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 743-44 (1979) (refusing to allow exclu-
sion of evidence obtained in violation of applicable Internal Revenue Service regulations).
For a recent summary of cases on this point, see Podgor, supra note 155, at 189-94.
157. A-rroRNEYs' MANUAL, supra note 141, at 9-27.150.
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B. The Validity of the Stewart Securities Fraud Charge
Given the standards, guidance, and discretion applicable to
prosecutorial charging decisions, the contours of applicable law, and
the allegations of the Indictment, the decision to charge Stewart with
securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 is apparently legally valid, although
the analyses giving rise to this conclusion do raise some significant
unanswered questions regarding prosecutorial discretion and impor-
tant interpretive issues under each of the three core Rule lOb-5 ele-
ments that would need to be resolved at trial (and, perhaps, on
appeal).15 The nature of the conduct proscribed by Rule lOb-5 is
broad and amorphous (and, in fact, is constantly evolving to include
new undesired behaviors).159 In this expansive and changing substan-
tive law environment, the government had set forth allegations in the
Indictment that could, if proven true, satisfy each of the three key
elements of its case, and these allegations collectively were sufficient
to constitute probable cause. Moreover, there is no evidence of any
actual abuse of discretion in the charging decision.16 °
158. The charges based on these allegations have been described by some as unusual or
"novel." United States v. Stewart, 03 Cr. 717 (MGC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 789, at *5-*6;
Moohr, supra note 4, at 179; see Stephen Bainbridge, Was Martha Stewart's Denial Material?
The Problem with Count 9 (Dec. 4, 2003), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2003/
12/wasmarthastew.html (noting and endorsing the court's view that the Rule 10b-5
charge is "a bit of a stretch"); Henry Blodget, The Charges Against Martha, SLATE, Dec. 3,
2003, http://slate.msn.com/id/2091480/entry/2091866 (terming the Rule 10b-5 charge
"controversial"). However, it is important to note that the court denied Stewart's motion
to dismiss the Rule 10b-5 charge. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Martha Stewart, at 16-
17, United States v. Stewart, 04-3953(L)-cr (2d Cir. 2006), available at http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/whitecollarcrime..blog/files/Brief.pdf; Cynthia A. Caillavet, Comment, From
Nike v. Kasky to MARTHA STEWART: First Amendment Protection for Corporate Speakers'
Denials of Public Criminal Allegations, 94J. CRIM. L. & CRUMINOLOGY 1033, 1039 (2004).
159. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save MARTHA STEWART? Observations About Equal
Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 256-61 (2003)
(describing this pattern in insider trading litigation under Rule 10b-5); Donald C.
Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S7 (1993) (a seminal
work on Rule lOb-5's flexibility); Moohr, supra note 4, at 179 (noting, in the context of a
discussion of criminal litigation under Rule 10b-5, that a pattern of "prosecutors raising
new interpretations and courts acceding to them-leads to an incremental, but inexorable,
expansion of the laws").
160. Cf Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron's Legacy, 8 BUFF. CiM. L. REV. 221, 256 (2004) (not-
ing, after a review of corporate fraud cases including the Stewart case, that "there is no
evidence of 'scapegoating' for the sake of expediency"). One commentator expressly re-
futes any allegation that Stewart was prosecuted because of her public-figure status.
For example, some critical commentary in the wake of the indictment of Martha
Stewart extolled the use of federal prosecutorial discretion to target a celebrity-
as always assuming, for argument's sake, that the indictment satisfies the Princi-
ples of Federal Prosecution-because of the greater deterrent value such a prose-
cution provides. My view, and the implicit view of the United States Attorney who
brought the indictment, is that Stewart's celebrity status is not a relevant differ-
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1. Manipulation or Deception.-For example, the Indictment ad-
dresses whether Stewart's alleged misrepresentations as to the reason
for the sale of her ImClone stock were actionable under Rule 10b-5 by
detailing the four public statements made by Stewart and asserting
that they are manipulative and deceptive because of their falsity.'
Yet, it is not clear that Stewart's alleged misstatements about her per-
sonal stock sale were devices, schemes, artifices, acts, practices, or
courses of business that are proscribed by Rule lOb-5.16 2 This author
has not found any reported case with facts substantially similar to
those alleged in the Indictment. However, it is conceivable, based on
the facts set forth in the Indictment, that Stewart's public statements
were made to "artificially" affect the market for MSLO's stock, raising
the possibility that her conduct was manipulative under Rule lOb-5.1 63
Moreover, the allegations describe conduct (i.e., misrepresenting
Stewart's reason for the ImClone stock sale) that could be deemed
deceptive under existing decisional law, since the definition of "de-
ception" is fact-specific. 164
Further, to the extent the government's allegations of manipula-
tion or deception rely on Stewart's misstatement of a material fact, the
Indictment adequately alleges materiality.1 65 Based on the facts al-
leged in the Indictment, a court or jury could find it substantially
likely that a reasonable investor would find Stewart's alleged misrepre-
sentations important in buying or selling MSLO securities. In the al-
ternative, a court or jury could determine that it is substantially likely
that Stewart's alleged misrepresentations would be viewed by MSLO
investors as significantly altering the total mix of information made
available to them.
It is not clear, however, that a court would or should find Stew-
art's alleged misstatements to be material under Rule 1Ob-5, even
given the accuracy and completeness of the government's allegations
in the Indictment.166 The Stewart case involves the dissemination of
noncorporate information-facts about an insider's personal trading
ence and that her indictment must be justified without regard to it, notwithstand-
ing the likely gain in general deterrence. (Whether in practice a potential
defendant's notoriety exerts a subtle and improper influence is another matter.
Certainly on occasion it does.)
Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1164-65 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
161. See supra Part II.A.
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. See supra notes 22-23, 25 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 22, 24-25 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 88-99, 109 and accompanying text.
166. See Bainbridge, supra note 158 (suggesting that materiality is problematic in the
government's case). The Author further analyzes the materiality of Stewart's public state-
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transaction involving the securities of another corporation, rather
than facts about the issuer's financial condition, results of operations,
business plans, or securities. The misrepresentation of personal facts
by an insider is less likely to be material than the misstatement of cor-
porate facts in that it may not be substantially likely that a reasonable
investor would find personal facts about an insider-specifically, fac-
tual assertions supporting the insider's innocence of a crime-impor-
tant in making an investment decision in the corporation's
securities. 11 7 It is only because of Stewart's key executive status and
strong identification with MSLO 168 that we even entertain an argu-
ment as to materiality, and those facts, taken alone, may not be suffi-
cient to make out a case for materiality. 69 However, this materiality
argument has not been tested and the personal-rather-than-corporate
angle may better be addressed through questions about the "in con-
nection with" element.
2. "In Connection with" the Purchase or Sale of a Security.-The In-
dictment raises even more interesting issues with respect to satisfac-
tion of the "in connection with" requirement in Stewart's case. Do
any alleged manipulative or deceptive activities conducted by Stewart
have the requisite connection with a purchase or sale of securities
such that a securities fraud charge under Rule 10b-5 is valid?
It is important to note at the outset that Stewart's criminal action
is not based on manipulation or deception conducted by Stewart in
ments in a chapter of Martha Stewart's Legal Troubles, a forthcoming 2006 Carolina Aca-
demic Press book edited and co-authored by her.
167. Id. (questioning whether a reasonable investor would factor Stewart's statements
into a decision to trade).
168. See Jeffrey Sagalewicz, Comment, The Martha Duty: Protecting Shareholders from the
Criminal Behavior of Celebrity Corporate Figures, 83 OR. L. REv. 331, 334-37 (2004); Krysten
Crawford, Time to Cut Martha Loose?, Martha Stewart TV Show Is Suspended as Sentencing Date
Nears. Can Other Martha Brands Survive? CNN/MoNEY, May 20, 2004, http://money.cnn.
com/2004/05/19/news/midcaps/marthastewart; Susan C. Walker, Martha Settling Down,
Along with Company's Stock Price, FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 13, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,150206,00.html; When the CEO Is the Brand, but Falls from Grace, What's Next?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Apr. 7, 2004, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/index.cfm?
fa=ViewArticle&ID=956 [hereinafter CEO Is the Brand].
169. Bainbridge, supra note 158. But see SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F.
Supp. 53, 66 (D. Conn. 1988) ("An indictment for mail fraud of the president and founder
of the issuing corporation was a fact that any reasonable investor would have considered
important in making the decision to invest.... ."); In re Franchard Corp., Securities Act of
1933 Release No. 4710, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,113, at
82,043-44 (July 31, 1964) (finding information about the wrongful conduct of a founder,
key executive, and major stockholder to be material because, among other things, it is
.germane to an evaluation of the integrity of his management" and it evidences "the possi-
bility of a change in the control and management of registrant").
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her capacity as a corporate officer of MSLO acting on its behalf to
communicate matters to its security holders. Nor is the case about
manipulation or deception committed against a party in privity with
Stewart during the course of a securities transaction between Stewart
and that other party. In those types of cases, the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the purchase or sale of a security is
clear.' 7
0
Rather, the claims in the Stewart case, as alleged, involve a corpo-
rate insider's misrepresentations of facts relating to a personal transac-
tion made by Stewart in her individual capacity-the public sale of
securities in another corporation, one in which she was not an insider.
The Indictment alleges that this misrepresentation constituted fraud,
manipulation, and deception not as to the purchasers of Stewart's Im-
Clone stock, but instead as to those trading in securities of MSLO in
the public market. In a case like this, the appropriate test to be used
in applying the "in connection with" requirement is less clear. 171 Fun-
damentally, many of the approaches used by courts are grounded in
the courts' views on the policies underlying the 1934 Act in general
and Rule lOb-5 specifically. 172 The U.S. Supreme Court recently used
these policies to explain its application of the "'coincidence' test" in
interpreting the "in connection with" element.173
Yet, there is a connection between Stewart's statements about the
reason for the sale of her ImClone shares and any market purchase or
sale of MSLO securities made between the time of those statements
and the times that they may have been corrected in the market. Any
misstatements of a material fact by Stewart are connected to market
purchases and sales of MSLO securities by a thin thread: the thread
consisting of Stewart's strong identification with MSLO. 17 4 Under ex-
isting decisional law, it is possible that a judge or jury would find that
this thin thread constitutes a sufficient connection. For example,
Stewart consciously could abuse her identity with MSLO by making
public statements to affect the public market for MSLO's stock and
170. See, e.g., O'Hare, supra note 34, at 329 ("[I]n false corporate publicity cases, the
courts have adopted a foreseeability test, asking if the company's 'assertions are made ...
in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public."'); id. ("[I]n a classic
securities fraud case in which a person selling securities lies to the purchaser, there is no
question that the fraud was 'in connection with' the purchase or sale of a security because
the wrongdoer defrauded the victim into purchasing or selling his securities.").
171. See id. at 329-31 (describing various means used by courts in interpreting the "in
connection with" element in less certain cases).
172. Id. at 330.
173. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 821-24 (2002); see also O'Hare, supra note 34, at 331-
34 (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis in Zandford).
174. See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
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deceive its investors such that her conduct coincides with securities
transactions under the rule in SEC v. Zandford.175 Moreover, publicly
disseminated misstatements about a corporate executive whose per-
sonal identity, like that of Stewart, is effectively synonymous with the
corporation's identity may necessarily "touch" on transactions in the
corporation's securities under the rule in Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty CO. 17 6 In addition, under the rule in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., a court or jury could find that Stewart's alleged
misrepresentations constitute manipulative or deceptive conduct on
which a reasonable investor would rely in making an investment deci-
sion. 17 7 As thus interpreted, it appears that the facts on the "in con-
nection with" element adequately support the Rule 10b-5 charge.
3. Scienter.-Assuming Stewart manipulatively or deceptively
misrepresented a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security, it is essential that a prosecutor also assess whether her
manipulation or deception was carried out with the requisite state of
mind. Were her misstatements intentional, willful, or knowing? Were
they merely reckless? How does this determination impact the deci-
sion to pursue Stewart's alleged misrepresentations in a criminal,
rather than civil, action?
In the Indictment, the government essentially alleges that Stewart
knew that public statements affect public company stock prices, that
her ownership of a controlling interest in MSLO gave her a motive to
positively affect MSLO's stock price, that Stewart intentionally misrep-
resented the reason for the sale of her ImClone shares to sustain the
market price of MSLO's publicly traded common stock, and that Stew-
art intended to deceive MSLO investors in making those misstate-
ments. 178 In making these allegations, the prosecution has set out its
case in a manner, akin to motive and opportunity pleading in the civil
litigation arena, i7 ' that satisfies the scienter element of Rule lOb-5.18 0
At the same time, the allegations in the Indictment, by mentioning
Stewart's intent to manipulate or deceive MSLO investors in connec-
175. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
179. See O'Hare, supra note 34, at 335 n.64 (noting the acceptance of this pleading
method in two circuits under the enhanced pleading requirements of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
180. The Indictment allegations include facts analogous to some of those listed as evi-
dence of scienter in Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., notably those involving financial self-
interest. 194 F.3d 185, 206-07 (1st Cir. 1999).
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tion with their purchases and sales of securities in the market, appar-
ently satisfy the willfulness requirement necessary to a criminal
prosecution.181 Specifically, the Indictment alleges facts that, if
proven true, may be deemed to establish that Stewart voluntarily acted
with knowledge of the consequences of her actions and knew that her
conduct was unlawful.
18 2
4. Probable Cause and Other Prosecutorial Standards and Guidance.-
The preceding analysis of the Indictment's allegations in relation to
the elements of a criminal violation of Rule lOb-5 supports a conclu-
sion that the government had probable cause to charge Stewart with
securities fraud. Said another way, based on the facts alleged in the
Indictment, the prosecution had a reasonable belief that Stewart com-
mitted securities fraud.18 3 The federal grand jury that indicted Stew-
art found probable cause, resulting in the issuance of the
Indictment. i"4 Moreover, it is not obvious from the face of the Indict-
ment that there is an absence of probable cause, nor is there any indi-
cation that the government otherwise possessed information negating
the existence of probable cause to charge Stewart with securities
fraud.
The prosecutorial guidelines set forth in the Principles (as de-
scribed in Part III.A of this Article) provide a checklist in assessing the
government's decision to prosecute Stewart on the facts stated in the
181. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
183. Although the allegations in the Indictment regarding scienter are not directly sup-
ported with specific facts, see supra Part II.C, they readily support a reasonable belief that
Stewart committed securities fraud under Rule lOb-5. It does not matter, for purposes of
the professional conduct rules governing prosecutorial charging decisions, that the prose-
cutor may not be able to prove the truth of the allegations at trial. Tracey L. Meares,
Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incen-
tives, 64 FoRDHAm L. REV. 851, 864 (1995) ("[T]he ethical rules do not clearly prohibit the
prosecutor from deciding to charge an accused with offenses which the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe are factuallyjustified but which the prosecutor believes she prob-
ably will not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial."); Kenneth J. Melilli,
Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REv. 669, 680-81 ("PROBABLE
CAUSE is little more than heightened suspicion, and it is not even remotely sufficient to
screen out individuals who are factually not guilty.").
184. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975) ("[A]n indictment, 'fair upon its
face,' and returned by a 'properly constituted grand jury,' conclusively determines the exis-
tence of probable cause .... "); Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1191 (5th Cir. 1977)
("[A]n indictment by a properly constituted grand jury conclusively determines the exis-
tence of probable cause .... "); Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury
Independence, 41 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 1, 19 (2004) ("[A] grand jury indictment is deemed a
'judicial' probable cause determination .... "); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not
(and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 260, 299 (1995) ("Once the indictment
is returned, the issue of probable cause is conclusively determined.").
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Indictment. Although getting into the head of a prosecutor is as diffi-
cult as getting into the head of a criminal defendant, the Indictment
indicates that the government believed that Stewart's conduct consti-
tutes a criminal violation of Rule lOb-5, 8 5 and it is fair to assume that
the government found it probable that the admissible evidence would
be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.' 86 Moreover, in this
post-Enron era, it is axiomatic that a prosecutor would find that a sub-
stantial federal interest would be served by charging a public figure
chief executive officer with securities fraud.187 Further, it is not clear
that Stewart would have been subject to effective prosecution in an-
other jurisdiction. 8 '
However, a noncriminal alternative to prosecution did exist in
the Stewart case. 189 An SEC enforcement action or administrative pro-
ceeding could have been brought against Stewart for violation of Rule
lOb-5, subject to the scienter requirement and lower burden of proof
applicable to civil proceedings. 190 Although the availability and ade-
quacy of this alternative deserves careful scrutiny in the Stewart case,
the prosecutor no doubt decided (on the basis of, for example, the
difference in available remedies) that these alternatives were not "ade-
quate," such that criminal prosecution was warranted.'9 1
185. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. The Indictment is carefully and logi-
cally constructed to make out a valid securities fraud claim. See supra Part II.
186. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. Among the factors supporting a con-
clusion that charging is in the federal government's interest are "[flederal law enforce-
ment priorities" and "[t]he deterrent effect of prosecution," both of which would seem to
relate to charging Stewart with securities fraud in June 2003, a time of governmental and
public concern about securities fraud. A-ro- NEvs' MANUAL, supra note 141, at 9-27.230.
188. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part I.C (regarding applicable burdens of proof). Private actions, both
under Rule lOb-5 and under state law theories, also could vindicate some of the policy
goals underlying Stewart's criminal prosecution. In this regard, Ellen Podgor notes that
[t] he prosecutor's discretionary power is magnified in the white collar crime con-
text, where the characterization of conduct as criminal instead of tortious may be
within the prosecutor's realm of decision-making. Whether a prosecutor should
pursue wrongful conduct in an administrative arena or the criminal courts can
also be a prosecutorial decision. Internal limits for prosecution used in a particu-
lar United States Attorney's Office may be the controlling factor in some of these
decisions. Offices might use different threshold levels for proceeding with
prosecutions.
Podgor, supra note 135, at 1519 (footnote omitted).
191. The U.S. Attorneys'Manual encourages prosecutors to consider "all relevant factors"
in making the determination of whether a noncriminal alternative is adequate, but lists
three factors specifically: "[t] he sanctions available under the alternative means of disposi-
tion"; "[t]he likelihood that an effective sanction will be imposed"; and "[t]he effect of
non-criminal disposition on Federal law enforcement interests." ArTORNYS' MANUAL,
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There is a possibility, although it would be difficult to prove, that
bias or improper influences played a role in the decision to bring the
securities fraud charge against Stewart. For example, prosecutors may
have been influenced by her sex or her political affiliation, her activi-
ties, or her beliefs. 92 Further, as always is possible, individuals in-
volved in the prosecution of Stewart could have been influenced by
their own personal feelings concerning Stewart 93 or by the possible
effect of the charging decision on his or her own professional or per-
sonal circumstances.194 Admittedly, these motivations would be diffi-
cult to substantiate, despite their importance. 195
supra note 141, at 9-27.250. Given the close involvement of the SEC with the Department
of Justice in the investigation and enforcement of possible violations of law relating to
Stewart's sale of her ImClone shares, see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, SEC Charges Martha Stewart, Broker Peter Bacanovic with Illegal Insider
Trading (June 4, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-69.htm (in
which the SEC "acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the investigation of this
matter"), these and other factors likely were (or at least could have been) assessed.
192. See Heminway, supra note 159, at 251 (making similar and additional arguments
about the SEC's decision to bring an enforcement action against Stewart for insider trad-
ing violations based on the sale of her ImClone shares); Blodget, supra note 158 ("[I]t is
also plausible that Stewart . . .is being prosecuted primarily because she is famous and
rich-prosecuting famous, rich executives being a sure-fire way to incite riotous public
support, remedy the perceived mistakes of the past (toothless regulation and/or spineless
enforcement), and advance careers."). But see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
193. See Heminway, supra note 159, at 277-78 (noting that the public may have mixed
feelings about Stewart); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of
MARTHA STEWART, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2029 (2005) (describing how Stewart is both
admired and disparaged by the public). But see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
194. But see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
195. In this regard, one scholar notes:
The Supreme Court has affirmatively recognized judicial authority to review
prosecutorial charging decisions in two situations: when the decision to increase
charges was vindictive, and when the government improperly selected the defen-
dant based on an impermissible classification. Whether the prosecutor acted vin-
dictively or selected the defendant based on an unacceptable criterion focuses
judicial review of prosecutorial conduct squarely on the motivations of the partic-
ular attorneys who made the decision. The Court's approach, however, avoided
the hard issue of how to ascertain actual intent by adopting tests that made mean-
ingful inquiry into the prosecutor's state of mind irrelevant for a vindictive prose-
cution claim, and almost impossible for a selective prosecution claim. Any
judicial review of the decisions of whether to charge a particular person and
which crime should be charged seems to be an area in which the prosecutor's
thought process would be of paramount importance. The Court, however, has
made intent essentially irrelevant, most likely because it recognized that asking
prosecutors why they acted would be fruitless and perhaps even counter-
productive.
PeterJ. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713,
734 (1999). The parallels between the difficulty of proving prosecutorial motivation in this
context and the difficulty of proving scienter in the Stewart case are apparent.
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Finally, the Stewart securities fraud charge apparently was the
most serious offense that is consistent with Stewart's alleged con-
duct,1 9 6 and the prosecution likely found that the charge would result
in a sustainable conviction."t 7 The government's decision to bring ad-
ditional charges in the Indictment are similarly subject to
prosecutorial standards, guidance, and discretion but are not the sub-
ject of this Article.' 9 '
IV. SAVING MARTHA STEWART: A GOOD THING? 19 9
As a means of analyzing the value of the Stewart case as an exam-
ple of a specific type of securities fraud under Rule lOb-5 and already
having established that the charges against Stewart apparently are
valid, this Part examines the judge's decision to grant Stewart's mo-
196. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. The seriousness of an offense typically
is measured by reference to the severity of the penalties imposed upon violators. ATrOR-
NEYS' MANUAL, supra note 141, at 9-27.300 ("The 'most serious' offense is generally that
which yields the highest range under the sentencing guidelines."). Under current law, the
penalties for criminal violations of Rule lOb-5 include fines of up to $5,000,000, imprison-
ment for up to twenty years, or both. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. II 2002). As an alternative
under current law, one might bring a federal criminal action under the securities fraud
provision included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which provides for fines as provided
under the federal criminal law, or imprisonment of up to twenty-five years, or both. 18
U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. II 2002). Current penalties for conspiracy include fines as provided
under federal criminal law or imprisonment for up to five years, or both. Id. § 371 (2000).
Obstruction of justice currently carries possible penalties that include fines as provided
under the federal criminal law, imprisonment of up to five years, or both. Id. § 1505. The
crime of making false statements subjects defendants to penalties that include fines as pro-
vided under the federal criminal law, imprisonment of up to five years, or both. Id.
§ 1001 (a). Finally, perjury is punishable by fines as provided under the federal criminal
law, imprisonment of up to five years, or both. Id. § 1621. Fines for individuals under Title
18 of the United States Code are provided for in § 3571 (b). None apparently would be in
excess of the $5,000,000 fine imposed by 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. II 2002).
197. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
198. It is fair to note, however, that overcharging may have occurred in the Stewart case.
See Seigel & Slobogin, supra note 5, at 1108-09.
Overcharging is systemic. It flows from the structure of criminal law that facili-
tates this charging practice because many categories of crime contain lesser-
included offenses and because the same criminal conduct is described by differ-
ent overlapping offenses. The practice of overcharging also flows from the dis-
crepancy between the amount of information the prosecutor has at the outset of
the case and what the prosecutor expects to be able to prove at trial. Because the
prosecutor may not have as much information as she would like at the charging
stage, she may often believe that it is in her best interests to charge the defendant
with the most serious and as many crimes at the outset of the case to preserve
options for prosecution at a later time.
Overcharging is also due in part to an abhorrence of losing that is central to
prosecutorial culture.
Meares, supra note 183, at 868-69.
199. See supra note 133.
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tion for ajudgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Rule 29) before submitting the case to the
jury.2°° This judicial decision is important for at least two reasons.
First, by granting the motion for acquittal before the jury's delibera-
tions, the court denied the jury the opportunity to find the facts and
decide the case. Because the government cannot appeal Stewart's
judgment of acquittal (since an appeal would subject Stewart to
double jeopardy),2°1 this action by the judge completely foreclosed
criminal securities fraud liability on the part of Stewart for her alleged
misrepresentations. Second, the court's opinion granting Stewart's
acquittal has substantive import (as a ruling on the scienter element
of a Rule lOb-5 claim) for, among others, practitioners (including
transactional lawyers, as well as litigators in the public and private
spheres), judges, Congress, and the SEC. This Part summarizes the
procedural law applicable to the court's opinion acquitting Stewart of
securities fraud and analyzes the court's opinion in light of that law.
200. Motions for a judgment of acquittal are made under Rule 29, which provides:
After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the
court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any of-
fense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may
on its own consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. If
the court denies a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the govern-
ment's evidence, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the
right to do so.
FED. R. CrIM. PROC. 29(a). The rule goes on to note:
The court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial (where the
motion is made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case to the jury,
and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a
verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. If the court
reserves decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the
time the ruling was reserved.
FED. R. CRiM. PRoc. 29(b).
201. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 enables the trial judge upon her own
initiative or motion of the defense to direct ajudgment of acquittal in a criminal
trial at any time prior to the submission of the case to the jury. Once the judg-
ment of acquittal is entered, the government's right of appeal is effectively
blocked by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as the only rem-
edy available to the Court of Appeals would be to order a retrial. No matter how
irrational or capricious, the district judge's ruling terminating the prosecution
cannot be appealed.
Richard Sauber & Michael Waldman, Unlimited Power: Rule 29(a) and the Unreviewability of
Directed Judgments of Acquittal, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 433, 433-34 (1994) (footnote omitted); see
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . ").
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A. Law Applicable to a Judgment of Acquittal
A Rule 29 motion asks for acquittal of a criminal defendant be-
cause the government has failed to prove its case.2 °2 To decide a Rule
29 motion:
[T]he evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and, in appraising its sufficiency, it is not
necessary that the trial court or this court be convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. The
question is whether there is substantial evidence upon which
a jury might justifiably find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.2
0 3
Accordingly, the court's role is to determine whether the prosecu-
tion's evidence, taken as a whole, could support a conviction by a "rea-
sonable" jury.2 0 4 A conviction requires proof of each element of the
202. See supra note 200.
203. White v. United States, 279 F.2d 740, 748 (4th Cir. 1960); see also United States v.
O'Keefe, 825 F.2d 314, 319 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 726
(2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Robinson, 71 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D.D.C. 1947).
Another way of expressing the same rule is that the motion for judgment of ac-
quittal must be granted when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the government, is so scant that the jury could only speculate as to the defen-
dant's guilt, and is such that a reasonably-minded jury must have a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt.
United States v. Fearn, 589 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
204. Although numerous statements of the Rule 29 standard exist, one trial court
summarized:
In passing upon a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the trial judge must deter-
mine whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to deter-
mine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a
reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If he
concludes that upon the evidence there must be such a doubt in a reasonable
mind, he must grant the motion; or, to state it another way, if there is no evidence
upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the motion must be granted. But if a reasonable mind might fairly have a
reasonable doubt or might fairly not have one, the case is for the jury.
United States v. Hufford, 103 F. Supp. 859, 860 (M.D. Pa. 1952). Recent Second Circuit
opinions state the standard in a more succinct manner. See, e.g., United States v. Chen, 378
F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing the formulation of the standard inJackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); United States v. Thorn, 317 F.3d 107, 132 (2d Cir. 2003)
(same); United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Under Rule 29, a
district court will grant a motion to enter a judgment of acquittal on grounds of insuffi-
cient evidence if it concludes that no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."); United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2002)
("[A] district court can enter a judgment of acquittal on the grounds of insufficient evi-
dence only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the government's favor, it concludes no rational trier
of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt.2" 5 The court must take pains not
to appropriate the jury's task.20 6 Rule 29 motions are rarely
granted.2 °7
B. The Correctness and Efficacy of the Judge's Acquittal of Stewart
In rendering its February 27, 2004 opinion acquitting Stewart of
securities fraud, the court acknowledges that its role is to "determine
whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. '202 The standard that the court ini-
tially cites as applicable to its decision requires the court to "deter-
mine whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the
jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable
inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt."2 9 Interestingly, this formulation of the ap-
plicable decisionmaking standard is relatively old and potentially
more defendant-friendly than others, 210 although the court twice re-
205. See United States v. Ubl, 472 F. Supp. 1236, 1237 (N.D. Ohio 1979) ("[T]he trial
judge must determine whether the Government has presented sufficient evidence from
which reasonable jurors could conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard
must be applied to each and every element of the offense charged . ); see also supra
notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
206. United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he court must be
careful to avoid usurping the role of the jury."); Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 233
(D.C. Cir. 1947) (stating that the determination of reasonable doubt "is the jury's function,
provided the evidence is such as to permit a reasonable mind fairly to reach either of the
two conclusions"). The Curley court explains the need for restraint in the context of the
role of judge and jury in a criminal trial.
If the judge were to direct acquittal whenever in his opinion the evidence failed
to exclude every hypothesis but that of guilt, he would preempt the functions of
the jury. Under such rule, the judge would have to be convinced of guilt beyond
peradventure of doubt before the jury would be permitted to consider the case.
That is not the place of the jury in criminal procedure. They are the judges of the
facts and of guilt or innocence, not merely a device for checking upon the con-
clusions of the judge.
Id.
207. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Amy Baron-
Evans, An Important but Modest Check on Prosecutorial Overreaching and Wrongful Conviction,
BOSTON B.J. at 31, 31 (Sept.-Oct. 2004) ('judges agonize over RULE 29 motions and deny
them if the question is at all close. In the rare cases in which the motion is granted, the
rulings are not hidden, but are made in open court, often in published opinions, and
appear on the docket." (citation omitted)); Paul L. Hoffman, The "Blank Stare Phenomenon".
Proving Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, 25 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181, 187 (1995-
1996) ("Rule 29 motions are rarely granted even in cases where they should be, because
most judges prefer to send the case to the jury rather than risk criticism for acquitting the
defendant.").
208. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 370 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
209. Id. (quoting Curley, 160 F.2d at 233).
210. More recent articulations of the Rule 29 standard in the Second Circuit use fewer
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states the applicable standard in a less slanted manner. 91  It is unclear
from the opinion whether any particular articulation of the applicable
decisionmaking standard influenced the court's decision to acquit
Stewart of securities fraud, but it is possible that her initial statement
of the standard played a role in the outcome of the case.
In its opinion granting Stewart's motion for an acquittal, the
court focuses its analysis on the scienter element of the government's
case. The court finds that the facts adduced by the prosecution at trial
fall short of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart acted
with the scienter required under Rule lOb-5 and the willfulness re-
quired by section 32(a) of the 1934 Act.2 12 Specifically, the court con-
cludes that a jury would have to speculate in order to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Stewart acted with the required state of mind-
the intent to manipulate the price of MSLO's stock or deceive
MSLO's investors. 1 3
Two aspects of the court's opinion, taken together, raise ques-
tions about the correctness of its holding and undercut its efficacy.
First (and most importantly), the court fails to adequately explain and
support its view of the difference between a 'justifiable inference"
(which a jury is permitted to make in finding guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt),2 14 and speculation (which ajury is not permitted to do in
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) .215 Moreover, in light of the
weakness of the court's reasoning on the scienter element, the court
should have been more inclusive in the matters addressed in its opin-
qualifying adjectives and adverbs. See, e.g., Chen, 378 F.3d at 158 (omitting the requirement
that the trier of fact's findings of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt be fair);Jackson, 335 F.3d
at 180 (same); Thorn, 317 F.3d at 132 (same); Reyes, 302 F.3d at 52 (same). These recent
versions of the Rule 29 standard may make it more difficult for a judge to acquit a defen-
dant on a Rule 29 motion.
211. See Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See United States v. Hufford, 103 F. Supp. 859, 860 (M.D. Pa. 1952) (noting that the
jury has the right to, among other things, draw justifiable inferences of fact).
215. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395 (1943) ("[T]he essential require-
ment is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for probative facts, after making
due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party whose case is at-
tacked."); Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir. 1987)
("Although a jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence,
reasonable inferences themselves must be more than speculation and conjecture."); Dan-
iels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[A] jury will not
be allowed to engage in a degree of speculation and conjecture that renders its finding a
guess or mere possibility."); Curley, 160 F.2d at 232 ("The jury may not be permitted to
conjecture merely, or to conclude upon pure speculation .. ").
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ion.2 1 6 Specifically, the court's exclusive focus on scienter ignores al-
ternative bases for an acquittal-other questionable elements of the
government's case against Stewart-including most importantly
whether Stewart's misrepresentations were made in connection with a
purchase or sale of securities (a matter to which the court refers, al-
beit indirectly, in its opinion).217 The collective impact of these attrib-
utes of the opinion is that the court shortcuts its reasoning in a
manner that makes its decision appear somewhat goal-oriented, weak-
ening its impact, if not its validity.
1. Reasonable Inferences or Speculation ?-The court's opinion re-
lies on a critical distinction-that between justifiable inferences from
evidence adduced at trial and speculation. In its opinion, the court
sets forth the facts that it believed the government proved at trial and
the reasonable inferences that the jury could have made from those
facts.21 In analyzing the facts and inferences in light of the scienter
element, the court finds that the prosecution did not prove its case. 219
The court then finds "that a reasonable juror could not, without
resorting to speculation and surmise, find beyond a reasonable doubt
216. One might logically question why a judge should be more thorough when her deci-
sion is not reviewable. Certainly, a judge in this circumstance does not fear any reputa-
tional or other disadvantage associated with being overruled by a higher court. However,
the reasoning supporting a judge's decision on a Rule 29 motion should not depend on
whether the decision is subject to review. It is a serious matter in our criminal justice
system when ajudge preempts or nullifies ajury determination, a determination that vindi-
cates the public's right to fair enforcement of the law. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 100 (1978) (noting the public's deprivation of an important right when a case is taken
away from the jury); cf Sauber & Waldman, supra note 201, at 452-56 (noting that truth-
seeking, uniformity, consistency, fairness, and careful consideration are important criminal
justice objectives that are not well-served by allowing judges to grant Rule 29 motions on a
nonappealable basis before jury deliberations). Because the appellate review that normally
would protect the public's rights in a criminal prosecution is unavailable for judgments of
acquittal granted before jury deliberations, the judiciary should be encouraged to provide
conclusive and well-documented support for a Rule 29judgment of acquittal. The produc-
tion of a well-reasoned, complete opinion should improve the quality of both the judge's
decisionmaking and any resulting law. See Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-
Centered Legal Process, 89 IOwA L. REv. 1159, 1185-86 (2004) (contending that the process of
constructing a thoroughly researched, comprehensive opinion creates better precedent).
217. See supra Part I.A.2. This Author also has questions, as did Stewart, about whether
Stewart's alleged misrepresentations are material under the tests set forth in TSC Industries
and Basic. See supra notes 31-33 & 166-169 and accompanying text. Because the substance
of the materiality issue was neither addressed nor alluded to by the court in its opinion, see
infra note 256, and is not otherwise necessary to the critique of the court's opinion offered
in this Article, it shall be left for another day.
218. See supra Part II.C.
219. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.
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that Stewart's purpose was to influence the market in MSLO
"1220securities.
The court's reasoning in support of its opinion is conclusory. For
example, in response to each of the government's arguments that an
inference of scienter could be drawn from the context in which Stew-
art's statements were made, the court merely restates the proven facts
and concludes that they did not constitute evidence of, or allow rea-
sonable inferences as to, Stewart's intent.221 The court does not de-
scribe the logical disconnect between the evidence adduced at trial,
including permissible inferences drawn from that evidence, and the
state of mind requisite to a criminal violation of Rule lOb-5. The
court's approach is particularly disquieting as applied to Stewart's
fourth misrepresentation-the reading of the June 18, 2002 press re-
lease at the June 19, 2002 conference attended by analysts and inves-
tors-which the court classifies as "a closer question."222 The facts
adduced by the government at trial as to this fourth alleged misrepre-
sentation appear to be sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that Stewart could foresee the potential market impact of a mis-
statement.223 Under the circumstances, the judge may have been too
quick to grant Stewart's motion for acquittal, which could have been
decided under Rule 29 on an appealable basis after a jury determina-
tion of guilt.2 24
Given the magnitude of the court's decision to grant Stewart an
acquittal and the acknowledged closeness of the question as to
whether the government may have proven its case against Stewart on
220. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). By focusing on
purpose" in this statement, the Stewart court also may be criticized for ignoring (without
explanation) decisional law on scienter that rejects this definition of scienter (preferring,
instead, to focus on what the defendant reasonably could foresee as the consequence of
her misstatement). SeeJAMEs D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
672 (5th ed. 2006); supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. Yet, the Stewart court is not
the only court to define scienter by reference to the defendant's purpose. See In re Merrill
Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (focus-
ing on the purpose behind the deceptive acts).
221. The court twice indicates that the evidence would better include proof of intent if
Stewart had a more active role in arranging for the dissemination of her statements. See
Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 376-77. Yet in each case, Stewart chose to make her statements
in forums that were easily accessible or targeted toward investors, including MSLO inves-
tors. The court even noted that Stewart verbally acknowledged the likely interest of the
audience of analysts and investors in her statements about the sale of her ImClone shares.
Id. at 377.
222. Id. Apparently, the more stringent burden of proof applicable to criminal actions
played a key role in thejudge's holding. Id. at 369-70; see Caillavet, supra note 158, at 1040-
41 (recognizing that Stewart could be held civilly liable for her statements).
223. See supra notes 121-130 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 200.
2006]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the scienter element (at least with respect to the statements made at
the June 19, 2002 conference), the court's reasoning is missing impor-
tant definitional links, links that would help the court establish and
clarify her view of the difference between justifiable, rational, or rea-
sonable inferences and mere speculation, as each relate to this case.
Admittedly, the distinction is a difficult one.225 Fortunately, some gui-
dance in this regard is provided by courts in other jurisdictions and
contexts.
For example, in the civil context,226 one federal district court
roots the definition of a "reasonable inference" in logic and
probability.
The line between a reasonable inference that may permissi-
bly be drawn by a jury from basic facts in evidence and an
impermissible speculation is not drawn by judicial idiosyncra-
cies. The line is drawn by the laws of logic. If there is an
experience of logical probability that an ultimate fact will fol-
low a stated narrative or historical fact, then the jury is given
the opportunity to draw a conclusion because there is a rea-
sonable probability that the conclusion flows from the
proven facts.
2 2 7
Another federal circuit court defines "reasonable" inferences as "in-
ferences which may be drawn from the evidence without resort to
speculation." 228 The same court notes that a civil case should be de-
cided by the court, rather than ajury, "[w]hen the evidence is so one-
sided as to leave no room for any reasonable difference of opinion as
to how the case should be decided."2 9 Of course, "[w] hen the record
225. See Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir. 1987)
("The line between 'reasonable inferences' and mere speculation is impossible to define
with any precision.").
226. Although one generally would not want to apply procedural observations from civil
cases in the criminal context, they do serve a limited use here. In this regard, it is signifi-
cant to note that "the power to direct an acquittal developed as a corollary to the directed
verdict in civil cases." Sauber & Waldman, supra note 201, at 434.
227. Tose v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 895 (3d Cir. 1981); accord MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 640 (l1th ed. 2004) (defining "inference" as, among
other things, "the act of passing from one proposition, statement, orjudgment considered
as true to another whose truth is believed to follow from that of the former").
228. Hauser v. Equifax, Inc., 602 F.2d 811, 814 (8th Cir. 1979); accord United States v.
Galbraith, 20 F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir. 1994) ("An inference must be more than specula-
tion and conjecture to be reasonable."). An alternative definition of "reasonable infer-
ences" that was articulated more recently in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, provides that
"such inferences as are born of common experience or are the product of a decision
maker's special expertise-are within the rightful province of the decider of fact to make."
Snyder v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 36 Fed. Cl. 461, 466 (Fed. Cl. 1996).
229. Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 883 (8th Cir. 1978);
accord Sip-Top, Inc. v. Ekco Group, Inc., 86 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1996).
[VOL. 65:380
INSIDER VIOLATIONS OF RULE 10B-5
contains no proof beyond speculation to support the verdict, judg-
ment as a matter of law is appropriate. "23 Yet, "[a] n inference is not
unreasonable simply because it is based in part on conjecture, for an
inference by definition is at least partially conjectural," 2 1 but "an in-
ference is unreasonable if it is at war with uncontradicted or
unimpeached facts. ' 2 3 2 Although these statements regarding reasona-
ble inferences were made in a civil law context and are not binding on
the Stewart court, they are nevertheless instructive. Among other
things, they indicate that the meaning of the word "speculation" may
be critical to a court's decision on a Rule 29 motion.
What, then, constitutes speculation? "Speculation" is defined as
"an act or instance of speculating."233 Among other things, to "specu-
late" is "to take [something] to be true on the basis of insufficient
evidence." 234 The concept of speculation often is tied to the related
concepts of conjecturing, 235 guessing, 236 or surmising 237 when it is
found in decisional law under Rule 29 (including in the Stewart
opinion) .238
Based on these definitions and a review of the court's opinion, it
is not clear that the court in the Stewart case properly understood the
nature of a reasonable inference or was able to properly separate in-
ferences from speculation. The proven facts and permissible infer-
ences noted by the court in its opinion constitute "substantial
evidence" 239 of Stewart's criminal intent; certainly, one would not
230. Sip-Top, 86 F.3d at 830.
231. Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1982).
232. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 851 (5th Cir. 1967).
233. MERPAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 227, at 1199.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 263 (defining the verb "conjecture" as "to arrive at or deduce by conjecture"
and defining the noun "conjecture" as an "inference from defective or presumptive evi-
dence" or "a conclusion deduced by surmise or guesswork").
236. Id. at 555 (defining the verb "guess" as "to form an opinion of from little or no
evidence").
237. Id. at 1258 (defining the verb "surmise" as "to form a notion of from scanty
evidence").
238. See, e.g., United States v. Pinckney, 85 F.3d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[A] conviction
cannot rest on mere speculation or conjecture."); Ford Motor Co. v. McDavid, 259 F.2d
261, 266 (4th Cir. 1958) ("[I]t is the duty of the court to withdraw the case from the jury
when the necessary inference is so tenuous that it rests merely upon speculation and con-
jecture."); United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[A] reasona-
ble juror could not, without resorting to speculation and surmise, find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Stewart's purpose was to influence the market in MSLO securi-
ties."); United States v. Batka, 724 F. Supp. 350, 352 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("There was no need
for the jury to guess or speculate .... ).
239. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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term them "scant. '2 40 The fact that the evidence is largely circumstan-
tial is not a barrier to a jury determination.2 4 1
More particularly, one cannot say that, given this evidence, the
government failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, facts that,
when taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution and com-
bined with the inferences cited as permissible by the court, constitute
the requisite state of mind for a criminal proceeding under Rule lOb-
5. The adduced facts and permissible inferences2 42 referenced by the
court apparently would permit a reasonable juror to fairly conclude
that the government proved its case on scienter beyond a reasonable
doubt without the jury having to speculate, conjecture, guess, or
surmise. Specifically, a reasonable juror could fairly find that Stew-
art's significant personal, financial interest in the price of MSLO's se-
curities, 2 4 3 together with her knowledge of the market for MSLO
securities, 24 4 her known effect on MSLO,2 4 5 her direction of inaccu-
rate and misleading statements to investors (among others), 2 46 and
her acknowledgement of the interest of those investors in the content
of those statements24 7 prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart
intended to manipulate the market for MSLO's securities or deceive
MSLO's investors. 24 8 The government's proof arguably established
beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a reasonable probability that
Stewart's alleged misstatement was made with the requisite intent.24
9
Although it would be helpful if the jury also had before it evidence
that Stewart was concerned about the market price of MSLO securities
at the time she was making these statements, that evidence is not an
240. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
241. United States v. Fermin, 32 F.3d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[A] jury may always base
its verdict on reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence."); see United States v.
Serpico, No. 99 CR 570, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9523, *12 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2001), rev'd on
other grounds, 320 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[A]lithough 'a conviction may be based solely
on reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, a conviction cannot rest on mere
speculation or conjecture.'" (quoting United States v. Pinckney, 85 F.3d 4, 7 (2d Cir.
1996)).
242. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
246. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 373, 376-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing
the facts as to the public release of each of Stewart's statements and the court's analysis of
those facts); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
247. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
248. This does not mean that Stewart actually would have been or should be convicted
of securities fraud if the matter were brought before ajury for decision. That is neither the
standard for granting ajudgment of acquittal under Rule 29 nor the subject of this Article.
249. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
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essential component to the government's case.25" The court should
have left the securities fraud charge to the jury for decision. 251
2. Omission of an Analysis of the "In Connection with" Element.-
One also might then question whether the court most effectively con-
veyed its decision on the motion to acquit by focusing its analysis ex-
clusively on the scienter element. Presumably, the court's decision to
focus on this element reflects its determination that scienter is the
only-or at least the clearest-aspect of the case that the government
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt.25 2
Yet, interestingly, the same speculation that the court found nec-
essary to the government's case on scienter also provides an important
link between Stewart's public representations about the sale of her
ImClone shares and the purchase and sale of MSLO's securities. In
other words, if the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Stewart "evinced a concern for the price of MSLO stock at
any time during the relevant period, 25 3 that same failure makes it
more difficult, if not impossible, for a reasonable juror to fairly con-
clude that Stewart's statements had the requisite connection with mar-
ket transactions in MSLO's securities under Rule 10b-5. Specifically,
absent factual proof or justifiable inference that Stewart was worried
about the price of MSLO's publicly traded stock, the government may
not have proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational juror that
Stewart's misrepresentations about her private transaction in Im-
250. The court found that the government's evidence did, in fact, give rise to a permissi-
ble inference that, in general, executives at MSLO were concerned about the market price
of MSLO's stock price during the period in which Stewart's public statements were made.
Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 373. The facts found by the court also indicate Stewart's status
as an executive of MSLO. Id. at 372.
251. Substantiating this judgment is the fact that the court, in sifting through the evi-
dence adduced at trial, appears to impermissibly weigh that evidence in ruling on Stewart's
Rule 29 motion, substituting its judgment on the meaning and relative weight of the facts
proven at trial for that of the jury. See, e.g., id. at 377 (interpreting and weighing against
each other certain statements made by Stewart at the June 19th conference). A case in
another circuit calls this practice into question. See United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967,
973 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting the jury's right to choose between reasonable alternatives from
the available evidence).
252. There is a possibility that the court chose to rely on the scienter element for other
reasons. For example, the court may have chosen to focus on scienter for strategic reasons
related to legal, reputational, or other benefits associated with this approach. Certainly,
the court was aware that, in deciding the Rule 29 motion before the jury had deliberated
on the Rule lOb-5 charge, its decision would not be reviewable by a higher court. The
timing of the court's choice also may have been influenced by the court's decision to focus
on scienter. See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
253. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
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Clone's securities "coincide" with25 4 or "touch"2 5 5 the public sales of
MSLO's stock. Although Stewart's Rule 29 motion argued that any
misrepresentation made by Stewart was not in connection with the
purchase or sale of MSLO's securities, there is no analysis of the "in
connection with" element in the court's opinion.256
Judgments that the court makes in its opinion also could have
been used by the court in attacking the government's case with re-
spect to the "in connection with" requirement. Most importantly, in
its reasoning on the scienter element, the court expressly acknowl-
edged the weakness of any connection between Stewart's alleged mis-
representations and the public market for MSLO's securities.257 The
court noted that Stewart's public statements "lack[ed] a direct con-
nection to the supposed purpose of the alleged deception "258 and
were "only circuitously related to the purpose of deceiving investors in
MSLO securities. '259 To the extent that the nexus between Stewart's
public statements and any alleged manipulative or deceptive purpose
or intent that she may have had in making them is tenuous, the con-
nection between her statements and any related trading in MSLO's
securities necessarily would be similarly weak. If Stewart had a manip-
ulative or deceptive intent, she would have had to intend the neces-
sary consequence of her actions26 0 -namely, public trading in
MSLO's securities resulting from her public statements. Accordingly,
the judge could have strengthened her decision by broadening the
scope of inquiry to include a discussion of and decision on the "in
connection with" element.
V. OBSERVATIONS ON THE MARTHA STEWART SECURITIES
FRAUD PROSECUTION
The foregoing analyses of the securities fraud charge brought
against Martha Stewart and aspects of the opinion acquitting Stewart
254. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
256. The court specifically notes that Stewart also raised Rule 29 arguments on the ma-
teriality of her public statements and the satisfaction of the "in connection with" element
of a Rule 10b-5 action. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 378 n.5. In a somewhat paradoxical
exercise ofjudicial restraint, the court expressly declined to address these issues because it
deemed them "not necessary." Id
257. Id at 378.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[N]o area of
the law-not even the criminal law-demands that a defendant have thought his actions
were illegal. A knowledge of what one is doing and the consequences of those actions
suffices.").
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of that charge highlight a number of interesting and potentially im-
portant aspects of a Rule lOb-5 case brought against a corporate in-
sider on the basis of misrepresentations made by the insider about
personal facts. Although the Stewart case was a criminal action, it nev-
ertheless sends messages about both criminal and civil claims under
Rule lOb-5, including class actions. This Part consolidates important
points from the analyses in Parts III and IV and sets forth key observa-
tions regarding those analyses.
261
A. Rule 10b-5 Allegations Based on Misrepresented Personal Facts
A legally valid criminal charge or civil claim under Rule 10b-5 for
misrepresentations relating to an insider's personal facts is possible,262
even if unusual. 263 Facts satisfying each of the key elements of a Rule
lOb-5 claim-activities, including misrepresentations of material fact,
constituting manipulation or deceit, conducted in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security, with scienter-may be alleged with
respect to misstatements about personal matters or transactions.264
However, the lack of a perfect fit between the elements of a Rule lOb-
5 claim (as defined under existing decisional law) and misrepresenta-
tions of wholly noncorporate facts complicates both the construction
of adequate allegations in an indictment or complaint 265 and the de-
termination of probable cause in a criminal action.266 Principal ques-
tions relate to: whether the misstated personal information about the
insider is "material";267 whether the insider's statements about private,
individual facts are made "in connection with" a purchase or sale of
261. Part V focuses on descriptive observations, but the need for normative observations
based on these analyses is apparent. Should prosecutors pursue criminal actions under
Rule lOb-5 on the basis of public misstatements made by an insider about her personal
affairs? Should an insider be found guilty or liable for violating Rule lOb-5 for lying to the
public about personal transactions conducted in her individual capacity? The answers to
these questions also are provocative and important; the conclusion in Part I only begins to
explore these areas. Ultimately, these and other similar inquiries would involve resolution
of tensions between the application of Rule lOb-5 in this unusual context and, for example,
First Amendment and (in the event of material nondisclosures) privacy issues. In fact,
Stewart attempted to raise First Amendment issues in her trial, but was prohibited from
doing so by the court. See United States v. Stewart, 03 Cr. 717 (MGC) 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 789, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004); see also Caillavet, supra note 158, at 1039-40.
262. See generally supra Part III.B.
263. See supra note 158.
264. See supra Part III.B.
265. See supra Part III.B.1-3. Complaints in private actions would have to meet the more
stringent pleading requirements included in the PSLRA. See supra notes 72-74 and accom-
panying text.
266. See supra Part III.B.4.
267. See supra Part III.B.1.
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securities;2 68 and whether the insider made the subject misrepresenta-
tions with the requisite scienter under Rule 10b-526 9 and, if applicable,
criminal intent under section 32(a) of the 1934 Act. 270 Moreover, in
private actions, there likely would be difficult questions as to reliance
(or transaction causation) 27 ' and loss causation 272 and as to the ade-
quate pleading of scienter.27 At the heart of these questions is the
corporate insider's ability to manipulate the market for the corpora-
tion's securities or deceive the investors in those securities with mis-
stated or undisclosed personal information. The investing public
must strongly identify the insider with the corporation in order for the
insider to have this ability.2 74 Absent a strong insider-corporate iden-
tity (which is relatively rare, but not unique), 275 a Rule lOb-5 claim
alleging that the insider manipulated the market for the corporation's
securities or deceived the corporation's investors by misrepresenting
personal information will fail to satisfy the requisite elements.
B. Difficulties of Proof in Rule 1 Ob-5 Cases Based on Misrepresented
Personal Facts
The complexities involved in validly and adequately alleging vio-
lations of Rule 1Ob-5 for insider misrepresentations of personal facts
translate into significant difficulties in proving those allegations at
trial.2 76 These evidentiary difficulties to a great extent arise out of the
same substantive questions that affect the charging decision or the
decision to bring a civil action.2 7 7 In particular, while direct, factual
evidence may be available to satisfy some of the elements of a criminal
or civil claim under Rule 1Ob-5, circumstantial evidence typically con-
stitutes all or substantially all of the evidence in satisfaction of the sci-
enter element.2 78 It would seem that, where the prosecution or a
268. See supra Part III.B.2.
269. See supra Part III.B.3.
270. See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. For example, it may be difficult for a
plaintiff to prove that, but for Stewart's public statements regarding the sale of her Im-
Clone shares, he would not have purchased MSLO securities.
272. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. For example, it may be difficult for a
plaintiff to prove that, but for Stewart's public statements regarding the sale of her Im-
Clone shares, she would not have suffered a loss (or as large a loss) on the sale of her
MSLO securities.
273. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
276. See generally supra Part III.B.
277. See supra notes 267-270 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff is relying exclusively or primarily on circumstantial evidence
to satisfy an element of its claim, sufficiency of the evidence is much
more likely to be an issue, making more probable a motion for acquit-
tal or for a directed verdict. A Rule 29 motion challenging the suffi-
ciency of evidence is difficult for a court to decide, especially in the
context of circumstantial evidence, because of an increased likelihood
of questions relating to whether inferences or speculation are neces-
sary or reasonable in drawing conclusions from the established
facts. 279 Moreover, in a case where the nexus between the defendant's
conduct and the securities market or investors is weak, circumstantial
evidence and permissible inferences based on that evidence may im-
pact more than just the scienter element of the claim. In particular,
proof of the "in connection with" requirement is at risk. Given these
evidentiary difficulties and the higher burden of proof applicable to
criminal actions under Rule lOb-5, it is particularly hard for a federal
prosecutor to prove a case of this kind.28°
Moreover, the standard-based decisional law source for the ele-
ments of a Rule 10b-5 claim renders those elements somewhat amor-
phous and allows the federal courts to expand or contract the
common understanding of one or more elements as new cases
arise.28' Accordingly, when a new or rare type of Rule 10b-5 claim is
brought, it is difficult for the government or plaintiffs to be certain
that the facts adduced at trial are sufficient to satisfy the required ele-
ments. In addition, it is difficult for a defendant to know what evi-
dence to present to refute the newfangled Rule lOb-5 claim brought
against her. The ultimate determination of these issues will be based
on multiple decisions by varied federal courts, including, perhaps, the
Supreme Court.
In this complex and ambiguous enforcement environment, the
unique nature of the claims against Stewart had specific implications
on her motion for acquittal. For example, the Stewart court expressly
contends with the uniqueness of the government's claim in address-
279. Cf United States v. Ruiz, 105 F.3d 1492, 1499-1500 (1st Cir. 1997) (describing the
relationship among Rule 29, circumstantial evidence, and inferences); United States v.
Mackay, 33 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Although the government may prove the exis-
tence of a conspiracy through circumstantial evidence, it 'must do more than pile infer-
ence upon inference upon which to base a conspiracy charge.'" (quoting United States v.
Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (5th Cir. 1981)).
280. See Caillavet, supra note 158, at 1040-41; see also supra notes 76-78 and accompany-
ing text.
281. See supra Part I.A.1-3 (describing the key elements of a Rule lOb-5 claim and the
uncertainties associated with the interpretation of those elements); see also supra note 159




ing its request for an inference as to the scienter element based on the
falsity of Stewart's public statements. The court finds that the prose-
cution is not entitled to that inference of scienter, expressly distin-
guishing this type of case from others under Rule lOb-5 in which an
inference was permitted based on false public statements.
In some securities fraud cases, the falsity of a defendant's
statements may lend weight to an inference of intent to
deceive. But in this case, the falsehoods lack a direct connec-
tion to the supposed purpose of the alleged deception. The
falsehoods involve Stewart's personal trade in the securities
of ImClone. Evidence of intent to defraud investors of a dif-
ferent company is not readily discernible from the content of
the falsehoods. 2
82
If the government, the SEC, or private plaintiffs bring additional Rule
lOb-5 claims based on misstatements of personal information, the
academy and the securities bar should expect further judicial clarifica-
tion of the elements, contours, and evidentiary implications of Rule
lOb-5 in this new context.
C. Prosecutorial and Judicial Conduct in the Context of Rule lOb-5
Although a number of noted scholars and other commentators
already have written about the charging decisions and the court's
judgment of acquittal in the Stewart case, 83 a few additional observa-
tions are warranted in light of the analyses included in this Article.
Specifically, it is important to note a few key points about the interac-
tion between prosecutorial and judicial discretion and the substantive
aspects of Rule 10b-5. The Stewart prosecution sheds additional light
on these subjects and reinforces existing scholarship. Each of these
observations bears further thought and analysis in the context of a
Rule 1Ob-5 charge against an insider based on misrepresentations of
personal facts.
Academic attacks on prosecutorial discretion are common. In
large part, this results from the fact that the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is regulated by standards that are so broad as to run the risk
of being meaningless. 284 The potential for exploitation is apparent
282. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
283. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
284. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L.
REv. 643, 697-700 (1997) (noting that current guidelines do not "require federal prosecu-
tors to have a rational basis for making" prosecutorial decisions); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1544 (1981) (finding federal policy
guidelines to be "general, malleable, and unhelpful"). For an interesting, recent critique
[VOL. 65:380
INSIDER VIOLATIONS OF RULE IOB-5
and is a source of concern regardless of whether actual abuse occurs
with any significant frequency. 28 5 In particular, the application of this
wide-ranging discretion in the field by individual U.S. Attorneys in dif-
ferent offices in the context of broad criminal prohibitions that are
substantially shaped by standards-based decisional law (as is the case
for criminal prosecutions under Rule 10b-5), can have far-reaching
effects on the substantive content of the law.2 86 These potential ef-
fects are not an apparent factor in the charging decision and should
be considered in a more formalized way in the prosecutorial decision-
making process.
The exercise of judicial discretion may have similarly important
substantive effects. The court chose to decide Stewart's Rule 29 mo-
tion before putting the case to the jury rather than waiting until after
the jury returned a guilty verdict.2 7 This is one of the relatively rare
instances in which a federal trial judge in a criminal jury trial gets the
opportunity to make significant law in a reported decision that is un-
appealable. 288 Notably, the acquittal opinion itself contributes to the
decisional law relating to the scienter element of Rule lOb-5. 28 9 How-
ever, the court's failure to resolve latent issues relating to the material-
ity and "in connection with" elements under Rule 10b-5 leaves a
substantive void that the court could have helped fill. Judicial discre-
tion should be exercised very carefully and explained thoroughly in
this environment.
The timing of the court's decision may have caused the court to
restrict the scope of its opinion. If the court had waited until after a
guilty verdict to decide Stewart's Rule 29 motion, the court's opinion
would have been appealable.29 0 It is possible (although this is specula-
of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, see Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call for a Directive,
Goal-Oriented Principle to Guide the Exercise of Discretion ly Federal Prosecutors, 39 VAL. U. L. REv.
625, 635-40 (2005).
285. For example, prosecutors, like other decisionmakers, are subject to cognitive biases
that may impact their ability to exercise the broad discretion afforded them. See Alafair S.
Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) (suggesting that prosecutorial decisionmaking failures
may be the result of cognitive biases).
286. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 242-251 and accompanying text: Although (perhaps) distinguisha-
ble on its facts from many other Rule lOb-5 actions, the Stewart case is the only reported
Rule 1Ob-5 decision located by this Author in which a corporate insider has been subject to
legal proceedings for public disclosures regarding a personal transaction.
290. See Dawn M. Phillips, When Rules Are More Important Than Justice, 87 J. CuM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1040, 1043 (1997) ("If a jury returns a guilty verdict, the government can
appeal a trial court's order granting a motion for judgment of acquittal because a success-
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tion) that the court would have written a more comprehensive opin-
ion-one that addresses each element required to be proven by the
government (or at least each element raised by Stewart in arguing the
motion for acquittal)-if the court had ruled on the motion after a
guilty verdict had been entered. 29 ' The mere possibility of appellate
review may incentivize a higher quality of judicial decisionmaking,
and actual appellate decisions should afford greater stability and cer-
tainty to the evolving decisional law under Rule lOb-5.292 Accordingly,
when a Rule 29 motion involves a complex and unsettled area or
novel application of the law (as it did in the Stewart case), there are
important reasons why a judge should exercise restraint and wait to
rule on the motion until after the jury has reached a guilty verdict.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what
it catches must be fraud. '293 Yet, the nature of securities fraud under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 continues to evolve to include new types
of conduct and potential enforcement targets. The Martha Stewart
Rule lOb-5 prosecution begins to explore the current outer limits of
securities fraud under Rule lOb-5 in a post-Enron world. For key cor-
porate executives-in particular, those who are strongly identified
with the corporations they manage-the calculus as to the conduct
and disclosure of their personal affairs now has changed.2 94 They now
should know that they may be subject to legal action based on a mis-
representation of (or a failure to disclose) personal facts. Those that
ful appeal by the government would not necessitate a retrial in violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Instead, the appeals court would remand the case for reinstatement of
the jury verdict." (footnote omitted)).
291. Other facts may have influenced the court's decision on the substantive contents of
its opinion. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize?
(The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51
EMORY L.J. 83, 100-11 (2002) (describing three features of judicial decisionmaking in the
securities class action context that explain the use of heuristics in that decisionmaking,
many of which would be applicable in other federal securities litigation contexts); Donald
C. Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to Create "Good" Securities Fraud Doctrine, 51 EMORY L.J.
309, 313-18 (2002) (supplementing the Bainbridge & Gulati analysis with further observa-
tions about decisionmaking in securities fraud cases).
292. See Sauber & Waldman, supra note 201, at 452-56 (making similar arguments in
support of eliminating the power of trial judges to order pre-verdict judgments of
acquittal).
293. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
294. See Oesterle, supra note 5, at 480 (" [T] he threat of the charge undoubtedly substan-
tially increases the potential downside risk of any claim of innocence by a high profile
CEO."). This is true regardless of whether any executive actually would be found guilty of,
or liable for, any Rule 1Ob-5 violation based on the misstatement of, or omission to state,
personal facts.
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desire these actions to succeed may argue for more specific guidance
on the interplay between this kind of misstatement and the various
applicable elements of Rule lOb-5 claims.
However, if this is not what Congress, the SEC, or corporate
America desires, it is now time to speak up and take action. Moderate
action could include congressional lawmaking (or SEC rulemaking or
interpretive guidance) on the meaning of the elements under Rule
lOb-5 in cases involving misrepresentations of personal facts. Possible
solutions lie in establishing rebuttable presumptions, shifting burdens
of proof, and clarifying the substantive nature of inquiries under each
element. Adding precision to the application of Rule lOb-5 in this
context certainly would give key executives better guidance regarding
disclosure of their personal affairs.
On the other hand, a more radical solution may be more appro-
priate. Perhaps no cause of action should exist based on an execu-
tive's misstatement of personal information; perhaps, investors should
be made responsible for their own investment decisionmaking-at
least to the extent of rational or normative behavior-when it is based
on information of a noncorporate nature.295 Adoption of this solu-
tion requires that lawmakers revisit the key policy underpinnings of
the 1934 Act, the promotion of investor protection and market integ-
rity. This inquiry may well lead to a conclusion that, in protecting
investors who trade based on publicly disclosed personal information
about key corporate executives, we are not promoting market integ-
rity. Specifically, if Rule 10b-5 is interpreted in a manner that protects
the (likely narrow) class of investors that trade on the basis of personal
information about key corporate executives (rather than information
about business fundamentals), investors and the public-at-large may
lose confidence in our public markets for securities because regula-
tory and corporate resources are being squandered on protecting a
fringe class of the overall investment community. Moreover, there is a
risk that desired disclosures of personal information by corporate insid-
ers will be stifled in an effort to protect investors that rely exclusively
or heavily on insider disclosures of personal information in making
their investment decisions (instead of merely taking the disclosed facts
into consideration as part of the total mix of information available).
Rule lOb-5 is not a cure-all for market risk.29 6 It should not be
295. Cf id. at 480-81 (noting, in reference to the Stewart case, that "[p]rosecutors unwit-
tingly were ignorant of a subtlety of securities law long understood by the courts in decid-
ing Rule 10b-5 cases, that not all acts that affect stock price should be actionable").
296. William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us DoJustice in a Time of Mad-
ness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 975 (2005) (asserting that, under Rule 10b-5, "wrongdoers... are
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interpreted in a manner that protects investors against themselves or
against risks that they voluntarily assume in purchasing or selling a
security.297 Consistent with its language and its judicially constructed
purpose, Rule lOb-5 should protect investors and the market against
conduct, including inaccurate or incomplete public disclosures of bus-
iness-oriented and corporate-affecting information, that is calculated
to manipulate the market for a corporation's securities or deceive in-
vestors. Accordingly, any solution to the problem of whether or how
to treat alleged misrepresentations of personal information as viola-
tions of Rule lOb-5 should balance the significance of the disclosure
of that type of information (in light of other publicly available infor-
mation) against the possible reasons for, and timing and manner of,
the release of the alleged misstatements. To achieve this objective,
Congress, the SEC, or our federal courts must establish a clearer,
more uniform meaning of the three core elements of a Rule lOb-5
cause of action in light of the foundational statutory goals of promot-
ing investor protection and market integrity.
Do we want to punish the corporate executives that make volun-
tary disclosures of inaccurate or incomplete personal information?
Do we want to reward investors that trade on the basis of those volun-
tary disclosures?29 Would that punishment and reward system fur-
ther the overall protection of investors? Would it promote confidence
in the public markets for securities? Is it otherwise in the public inter-
est? Time spent by Congress, the SEC, and the courts in reasoning
through these important, but difficult, questions could serve as a cata-
lyst for far-reaching legal change.
not insurers against market risk-or madness."); Bhavik R. Patel, Note, Securities Regula-
tion-Fraud Rule 10b-5 No Longer Scares the Judiciary, but May Scare Corporate Defendants: The
United States Supreme Court Switches Directions. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United International
Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588 (2001), 25 U. ARK. LIrLE ROCK L. REv. 191, 205 (2002)
("Abuses of Rule 1Ob-5 have caused severe consequences; for example, supporters of re-
form assert that individuals use Rule 10b-5 to hedge the risk of investment. Such abuse
occurs when investors simply sue under Rule 10b-5 to recover from an unexpected loss."
(footnotes omitted)).
297. See, e.g., Caan v. Kane-Miller Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,446, at 99,242 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1976) ("[T]he securities laws are not to be
used as an insurance policy for investors who choose voluntarily to disregard facts which
would have been uncovered by any reasonable person in their position."). For example,
investors who bought MSLO securities in June 2002 on the basis of Stewart's public state-
ments about the reason for her ImClone stock sale assumed the risk that, even if that
explanation were accurate and complete, a judge or jury could find that Stewart violated
the law and impose penalties (including imprisonment) on her for that violation.
298. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Effi-
ciency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 903 (1992) (raising a similar question: "if investors as
a group unwisely overreact to a bit of misinformation, should the defendant therefore be
held responsible to all traders?").
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